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INTRODUCTION
Elana was thirteen when her mother kicked her out of the house.' As a
result of her mother's neglect, she landed in foster care in a group home run by
the city. Frustrated by the fights and the bullying that she encountered at the
group home, Elana often spent time on the streets. During this time, she met a
man and woman who said that they would take care of her if she came to live
with them. They said they would provide her with a comfortable home, nice
clothes, and would help her "make money." Elana was enticed by the promise
of things that she did not have at home or in foster care and agreed to go
with them.
Soon, Elana found herself in unfamiliar surroundings and away from the
city she knew. She was forced to perform sexual acts for payment with multiple
adult males per day, enduring threats and abuse by the couple, from whom she
was afraid to flee. With no familial support, she was further isolated, unsure
where to go, and feared repercussions for having run away from foster care. She
was finally discovered after enduring six months of this abuse, when authorities
were alerted to a child prostitution ring being perpetrated by the couple, essen-
tially her abductors.
The legal status of children in Elana's situation currently varies
widely among states. Most states view and treat them as offenders for
prostitution, and they are often detained and prosecuted.! However, feder-
1. This story is a real case vignette, unfortunately not uncommon, from the author's
previous work representing juveniles at the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal
Aid Society of New York. Elana's real name has been changed to protect her
privacy.
2. See Ian Urbina, For Runaways, Sex Buys Survival, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 20o9, at Al
("If a 45-year-old man had sex with a 14-year-old girl and no money changed
hands,. . . he was likely to get jail time for statutory rape . . .. If the same man left
$8o on the table after having sex with her, she would probably be locked up for
prostitution and he would probably go home with a fine as a john." (quoting
Byron A. Fassett, Sergeant, Dallas Police Dep't)).
2
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al law' and a few stateS4 have begun to recognize these children as victims who
have endured sexual exploitation and statutory rape. Indeed, these children
have been more readily recognized as victims under federal sex trafficking laws,
particularly if they are born outside of the United States.5 Many victims and
survivors of this exploitation, upon discovery on the streets or otherwise, are
arrested, prosecuted, locked up with an array of offenders, and offered little re-
levant treatment or care for their trauma.' Recently, because of these opposing
3. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2006). Federal traf-
ficking law defines one form of severe trafficking in persons as "sex trafficking in
which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which
the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age." Id.
§ 7102(8)(A) (20o6); see infra Subsection II.C.i.
4. See infra Part III (describing four recent state legislative approaches to reduce or
eliminate the prosecution of minors for prostitution within those states).
5. See infra Subsection II.C.1 (discussing the statutory history of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2ooo (TVPA) and its original focus on foreign-born
victims of commercial sexual exploitation).
6. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: Hearing on H.R. 5575 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ith
Cong. 17 (2010) [hereinafter Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing] (statement
of Rep. Ted Poe) (noting that domestic minor victims of commercial sexual
exploitation are often arrested and that the short-term services they receive "do
not even begin to address the severe physical or psychological trauma that these
girls have encountered"); FRANCINE T. SHERMAN, DETENTION REFORM AND
GIRLS: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 23-28 (Pathways to Juvenile Det. Reform
Ser. No. 13, 2005) (noting the lack of appropriate psychological and medical ser-
vices available in girls' juvenile detention facilities despite the fact that an over-
whelming number of girls in detention have been subject to physical and sexual
abuse); Stephanie Halter, Factors That Influence Police Conceptualizations of Girls
Involved in Prostitution in Six U.S. Cities: Child Sexual Exploitation Victims or
Delinquents?, 15 CHILD MALTREATMENT 152, 158 (2010) (identifying deficiencies in
the current approach to commercial sexual exploitation cases, which uses deten-
tion as a penalty, and noting that "youth's experience in detention may not pro-
vide them with the necessary treatment and may impact their likelihood of engag-
ing in crime in the future"). One study, which interviewed girls in detention
centers across four California counties in 1998, found that 56% of the girls inter-
viewed reported past sexual abuse, SHERMAN, supra, at 21; however, juvenile de-
tention systematically provides little to no access to relevant programming to ad-
dress past sexual abuses and traumas, id. at 24-25. Put simply, "[i]f girls enter
detention particularly vulnerable due to their chaotic home lives, histories of
trauma, and high rates of mental illness, conditions in detention often exacerbate
their difficulties." Id. at 24. Another study, which interviewed girls in detention
and residential programs in five cities, examined girls' confinement conditions
and found that, in one facility, the lack of services to address the girls' involve-
ment in prostitution was a pressing issue amongst the girls interviewed. See
GIRLS' JUSTICE INITIATIVE, GIRLS IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: PERSPEC-
TIVES ON SERVICES AND CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 1, 6 (2003). Staff members
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perspectives and legal conflicts, courts and legislators have begun to change
course and advance novel interpretations of otherwise competing laws as well as
entirely new legal frameworks.
This Article discusses the competing legal practices that affect youth who
are subjected to commercial sexual exploitation, or "domestic minor sex traf-
ficking,"7 within the United States. The arrest of children for prostitution, a
form of commercial sexual exploitation, illustrates the confused legal status of
minors in our society and raises several questions. When should society treat
adolescents as children versus as adults? To what extent should society consider
children's developmental stages and their limited capacity to consent when
shaping policy or laws in general that affect them? Modern scientific research
has shown that underdevelopment in certain areas of the adolescent brain
affects behavior, decision making, and the ability to understand consequences.'
at one facility noted that they "lacked the gender and culturally responsive pro-
gramming needed to address patterns of sexual exploitation and victimization
common among detained girls," despite housing a significant number of prosti-
tuted girls. Id. at 8. Attorneys, judges, and girls noted the failure by staff members
in facilities to identify and address related medical issues, such as sexually trans-
mitted diseases. Id. at 5.
7. The terms "commercial sexual exploitation of youth" and "domestic sex traffick-
ing of minors" are used interchangeably by advocates and policymakers in the
United States as this exploitation is now recognized as trafficking under federal
law. In this Article, the terms are likewise used interchangeably. On the state level,
the term "commercial sexual exploitation of youth" is used with slightly greater
regularity. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13-32A.030(17) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (defin-
ing "sexually exploited child" as a person under the age of eighteen who is a vic-
tim of the crime of commercial sexual abuse of a minor); FRANCES GRAGG ET AL.,
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., NEw YORK PREVALENCE
STUDY OF COMMERCIALLY SEXUALLY EXPLOITED CHILDREN: FINAL REPORT 1
(2007). On the federal level, however, the emerging language in policy discourse is
"domestic sex trafficking of minors." For example, this is demonstrated by terms
in federal hearing titles, such as the Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, su-
pra note 6. This Article does not use the term "youth prostitute" or "teenage pros-
titute" as these are inaccurate and misleading descriptions of this social problem.
This Article does, however, explain that youth are "prostituted," as that captures
the common understanding of the practice whereby a third party, often referred
to as a pimp, causes a girl to be prostituted within the meaning of the applicable
penal code.
8. See generally Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412),
Sullivan v. Florida (2010) (No. 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778 (discussing compre-
hensive scientific studies of the adolescent brain and its comparative deci-
sion-making capabilities versus the fully developed adult brain). Furthermore, the
adolescent brain is not fully developed in areas affecting risk evaluation, emotion-
al regulation, and impulse control. Id. at 23; see also Elizabeth Cauffman &
Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents
May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741 (2000).
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However, the justice system often determines culpability and punishment as if
children possess adult capacities.9 Further questions related to the prosecution
of children like Elana involve the extent to which gender and sex biases drive
current policies. Finally, why should trafficking laws protect minors who were
born outside the United States and trafficked into the country for exploitation,
but not those born and exploited in America, like Elana?
The juxtaposition of statutory rape laws with the prosecution of juveniles
for prostitution illustrates a literal clash in the way that American society ad-
dresses the sexual victimization of children, children's ability to legally consent,
and societal expectations about behavior according to gender. By prosecuting
exploited children, current laws and practices contradict one another and fail to
assist the significant number of youth sold for sex on the street, on the Internet,
in strip clubs, and otherwise. This Article discusses new laws that shed the prac-
tice of treating these children as "criminal prostitutes" and shift to the more
appropriate understanding that they are survivors of exploitation. The Article
considers the societal status of adolescence together with research on commer-
cial sexual exploitation and proposes the development and implementation of
commonsense, consistent, and humane jurisprudence to promote recovery for
exploited children.
Part I provides background information about the commercial sexual
exploitation of domestic minors in the United States, examining the vulnerabil-
ity of runaway and homeless youth, particularly girls. It also discusses gender
stereotypes rooted in the past, within the juvenile justice system, and which
relate to current punitive policies toward youth charged with prostitution.
Finally, Part I analyzes the relationship between adolescent autonomy, adoles-
cents' ability to consent, and current debates on exploitation. Part II explains
the current prosecution practices that most states apply to commercially sexual-
ly exploited youth, and highlights the conflicts that arise with issues of consent
under "statutory rape" laws. It also discusses existing legal tensions that allow a
child to be both a victim and a "criminal" for the same act of sexual exploita-
tion. Part II also focuses on a decision, the first of its kind, by the Texas
Supreme Court to explicitly reject the prosecution of children under age four-
teen for acts to which they cannot legally consent. It discusses the evolving
federal responses to larger international trafficking problems, since these
9. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida To Challenge Juvenile Transfer
Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 107-08 (2010) (noting that, every year, approximately
200,000 youth are prosecuted, sentenced, or incarcerated as adults in the United
States); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence,
Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 793 (20o5) (discussing the
ways in which punitive criminal justice policies have obscured developmental
differences between juveniles and adults). Scott and Grisso argue that, during the
1980s and 1990s, political sentiments concerning youth crime could be characte-
rized by the pithy phrase, "adult time for adult crime." The resulting changes "are
embodied in several legislative strategies under which juveniles facing criminal
charges increasingly have been treated like their adult counterparts." Id. at 806-07.
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policies influence state laws and practices. These federal efforts to combat
international trafficking have gradually evolved over the last decade to include
domestic youth, as well.
Part III focuses on the emergence of recent legislation in various states and,
in particular, on the unique protection afforded by the Illinois Safe Children
Act. It analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of these varying legislative
approaches. Part IV explores how courts and legislators can best reconcile
conflicts between statutory rape and prostitution statutes. It concludes that
judicial decision making must be informed by considerations regarding adoles-
cent development, as reflected in statutory rape laws, and must avoid gender
biases that have been documented in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
It asserts that legislative action should not leave certain categories of youth vul-
nerable to criminal prosecution for prostitution; rather, states should take a
clear stance on reform by passing laws that negate the possibility of prosecution
of children for commercial sexual exploitation.
Prosecution of youth for prostitution is not legally coherent, and it is
inconsistent with best practices developed under federal law."o This Article calls
for current state prosecution practices to change by using elements of the Illi-
nois Safe Children Act as a model, thereby avoiding loopholes that can weaken
the potential for such laws to effect change for exploited youth.
I. THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED
STATES
Commercial sexual exploitation of youth-sometimes referred to as
domestic minor sex trafficking-is the sexual abuse of a minor for economic
gain." The FBI calls it the "most overlooked and under-investigated form of
child sexual abuse" facing American society today." The White-Slave Traffic
Act (Mann Act) 3 first addressed the prostitution of juveniles in 191o. This law,
and others passed in the 1970s and 198os when the issue gained greater national
attention,'14 focused mainly on increasing penalties for certain sexually exploi-
10. See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (20o6).
11. JAY ALBANESE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN: WHAT Do WE KNOW AND WHAT Do WE Do ABOUT IT? 1 (2007),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/215733.pdf.
12. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 18 (statement of Rep. Ted
Poe (quoting Patrick Fransen, Special Agent, Fed. Bureau of Investigation's
Innocence Lost Task Force)).
13. Ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2006)).
14. See, e.g., Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2252, 2256, 2423
(2oo6)) (originally enacted Feb. 6, 1978); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2G2.2 (2010) (originally effective in 1987); see also D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD-
6
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tive behaviors against minors. This early legislative emphasis on penalties was
based on a strategy of deterrence-a strategy that remains an important part of
policies addressing the issue today." Federal prosecutions under the Mann Act
continue against individuals alleged to have sexually exploited children for eco-
nomic gain." However, the physical and psychological needs of sexually
exploited minors were not the focus of the Mann Act, nor did the legislation
address the legal status of these minors as victims or offenders. These are two
problem areas that still persist today.
A. Background Information About Exploited Youth
Statistics and research help shed some light on the prevalence of commer-
cial exploitation of children, but they do not tell the complete story. Estimates
of the numbers of children prostituted each year vary greatly because this group
is a difficult population to reach. In addition, confusion among law enforce-
ment officials about how to respond to these youth both impedes uniform data
collection and contributes to the dearth of reliable estimates. 7 As a result, the
estimates of commercially sexually exploited children in the United States have
ranged from only a few thousand to over three million."8 A much-cited study
estimates that between 240,000 and 340,000 children were "at risk of" commer-
cial sexual exploitation during the calendar year ending in December 2000.'9
REN OF THE NIGHT 1 (1985) (stating that "only since the mid-1970s has juvenile
prostitution become an issue of widespread national attention").
15. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 128 (statement of Francey
Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdiction,
Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.) (noting the necessity of a "multifaceted
attack on child exploitation on three fronts: [p]revention, deterrence, and
interdiction").
I6. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 428 F. App'x 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2011).
17. David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Prostitution of Juveniles: Patterns from
NIBRS, Juv. JusT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.), June 2004, at 4 ("Uncer-
tainty within law enforcement agencies on how to respond to the prostitution of
juveniles and how to treat juvenile prostitutes has in turn contributed to a scarcity
of reliable, consistent information about the problem."). Indeed, the child's vari-
able status as victim or offender may cause officers to fail to record the event. Id.;
see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 340 (ioth ed.
2010) (noting a lack of uniform data collection of the numbers of trafficking vic-
tims). This lack of data "remains an impediment to a comprehensive understand-
ing of the enforcement and victim service response to trafficking in the United
States." Id.
18. See GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7, at 2 (citing YOUTH ADVOCATE PROGRAM INT'L,
CHILDREN FOR SALE: YOUTH INVOLVED IN PROSTITUTION, PORNOGRAPHY, AND
SEX TRAFFICKING 1 (1998)).
19. See RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOI-
TATION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA AND MEXICO 144 (2002), available at
7
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Some researchers dispute the scientific basis for this and other estimates,2 o and,
overall, more concrete data and research is needed. The National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children estimates that ioo,ooo minors are "prostituted"
in the United States each year."
While centralized arrest data is lacking, the most recent state data suggests
that there were at least 15oo arrests of juveniles for prostitution across the Unit-
ed States in 20o8.22 Law enforcement agencies must keep better records of both
arrests for prostitution and instances in which prostituted children are encoun-
tered but not arrested for prostitution, as recording will help determine the
overall prevalence of the problem." Though federal human trafficking law now
http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/restes/CSECFiles/CompleteCSEC_020220.pdf. The
authors are careful to note the limitations of their survey and data collection. Id.
at 143-44 (stating that a different methodology and more resources would be
needed to perform "a national prevalence and incidence survey" to produce "an
actual headcount"). But see Kimberly Mitchell, David Finkelhor & Janis Wolak,
Conceptualizing Juvenile Prostitution as Child Maltreatment: Findings from the Na-
tional Juvenile Prostitution Study, 15 CHILD MALTREATMENT 18, 21 (2010) (citing
MICHELLE STRANSKY & DAVID FINKELHOR, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RE-
SEARCH CTR., How MANY JUVENILES ARE INVOLVED IN PROSTITUTION IN THE
U.S.? (20o8) (critiquing the scientific methods used for Estes and Weiner's esti-
mate as well as other existing estimates), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/
prostitution/JuvenileProstitution factsheet.pdf).
20. See, e.g., Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra note 19, at 21.
21. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 137-38 (statement of Er-
nie Allen, President and CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children) (de-
fending an estimate of loo,ooo derived from Estes & Weiner, supra note 19, and
noting that it is a conservative estimate). The National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children works in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice. Id.
at 142.
22. See Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, Juv. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of
Justice, D.C.), Dec. 2009, at 3. In most states, not all jurisdictions reported arrest
data to the FBI. Id. at ii. The statistics that are recorded on juvenile arrests for
prostitution in the United States remained fairly constant (ranging from 1200 to
1400) between 1994 and 2000 before rising to a high of 1800 in 2004. See OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, EASY ACCESS To FBI
ARREST STATISTICS: 1994-2007, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/
asp/ucr display.asp (set "Display Options: Counts" to "Juveniles," then select the
time period "1994-2000" or "2001-2008").
23. See, e.g., Finkelhor & Ormrod, supra note 17, at 1, 4. The U.S. Department of Jus-
tice has recognized the lack of definitive data in the specific context of commercial
sexual exploitation of minors and said it expects to provide the results of a study
on the prevalence of the problem in 2011. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking
Hearing, supra note 6, at 126 (statement of Francey Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for
Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdiction, Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y
Gen.). The study will address the number of youth under the age of eighteen who
were victims of commercial sexual exploitation in the United States in 20o8 and
8
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mandates that incidents of domestic minor trafficking be collected and
reported, law enforcement agencies have not yet universally implemented the
central reporting requirement successfully. 4 Often, instances of youth prostitu-
tion are improperly excluded from data that records trafficking because law
enforcement officials do not properly consider these occurrences to be "traf-
ficking" as the term has evolved."
The personal histories and characteristics shared by many of these children
are grim. Their pasts often reveal that the social systems designed to protect
them have already failed them. Some children are prostituted as early as age
nine, while the average age of entry into prostitution by children is estimated to
be between twelve and fourteen." Many of these children ran away from home
or were abandoned by family members; many are homeless and known as
youth who have been "thrown away."" They often live on the streets or move
from place to place, staying with friends and acquaintances. Sexual abuse earlier
in childhood is common among youth who are later commercially exploited."
attempt to ascertain how many of these children became known to law enforce-
ment. Id.
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Supra note 17, at 340 ("Despite the mandates of 2005 and
20o8 amendments to the TVPA, uniform data collection for trafficking crimes or
numbers of victims among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies did
not occur during the reporting period.").
25. See HEATHER J. CLAWSON & NICOLE DUTCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., IDENTIFYING VICTIMs OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: INHERENT CHALLENGES
AND PROMISING STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD 2-3 (2008), available at http://aspe
.hhs.gov/hsp/o7/humantrafficking/ldentVict/ib.pdf (noting that law enforcement
officials often do not view prostitution incidents as trafficking crimes).
26. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 144 (statement of
Ernie Allen, President and CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children)
(noting that the average age at which boys enter prostitution is between eleven
and thirteen, while, for girls, the average is between twelve and fourteen); Norma
Hotaling, Kristie Miller & Elizabeth Trudeau, The Commercial Sexual Exploitation
of Women and Girls: A Survivor Service Provider's Perspective, 18 YALE J.L. & FE-
MINISM 181, 187 (2oo6). A recent study tracking precinct arrest data found that,
among juveniles arrested for prostitution, 1o% were age twelve or thirteen, 33%
were age fourteen or fifteen, and 55% percent were age sixteen or seventeen. See
Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra note 19, at 25.
27. ESTES & WEINER, supra note 19, at 21 (the terms "thrownaway" or "throw away"
youth are sometimes used as catch-all phrases to describe children who are not
permitted to return home); see also Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra note 19, at
18 (noting that youth who are homeless or without familial support are vulnerable
to commercial sexual exploitation).
28. ESTES & WEINER, supra note 19, at n1; see also HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 7 (2009), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/o7/HumanTrafficking/LitRev/index.pdf.
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In addition, these youth are likely to have experienced poverty and to have been
involved with the child welfare system. One study estimates that up to 85% of
the exploited youth in New York have been involved in the child welfare
system.2 9 Often, youth turn to the streets because their own homes become
intolerable, or they are formally removed from their homes by child protective
services.
After leaving home, however, many children come to find that their new
situation is even worse.3 o "The risk of involvement in. .. commercial sexual
exploitation increases the longer youth remain homeless. . . ."3' Once subjected
to this exploitation, children "are at substantial risk of [contracting] sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS."32 They are also frequently victims
of significant physical abuse in addition to sexual trauma." Scholars note that
29. See GRAGG ET AL., Supra note 7, at ii; see also Cassi Feldman, Report Finds 2,000 of
State's Children Are Sexually Exploited, Many in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 2007, at B6.
30. See Clyde Haberman, The Young and Exploited Ask for Help, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2007, at Bi (quoting testimony at a New York City Council hearing on the com-
mercial sexual exploitation of youth in New York City during which a witness
who had formerly been sexually exploited explained, "I thought that my pimp was
going to protect me.... All he did was abuse me."). The difficulty of living with-
out familial support makes these youth more likely to believe representations by
pimps because promises of protection sound better than the current situations
these youth face. See Judi Villa, Lies Trap Children in Life as Prostitutes: Phoenix
Boosts Effort To Save Victims, Punish Pimps, Johns, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 2007,
at Ai; see also Ric CURTIS ET AL., THE CSEC POPULATION IN NEW YORK CITY:
SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, AND NEEDS 47-48 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, The Commercial
Sexual Exploitation of Children in New York City Ser. No. 1, 20o8), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/grants/225o83.pdf (discussing an interview with
an adolescent girl who was approached and recruited by a pimp while she was
crying on the steps of her group foster care home, and who later realized that her
new life with the pimp was as bad as or worse than it was at the foster home; she
explains, "But once I started seein' certain things and certain actions, it was like, I
might as well have stayed in the hell I was in . . . ").
31. See NAT'L ALLIANCE To END HOMELESSNESS, HOMELESS YOUTH AND SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION: RESEARCH, FINDINGS, AND PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS 8 (2009),
available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/files/2559-fileSexualExploitation
_of HomelessYouth_10_2oo9.pdf; see also Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra
note 19, at 18 (noting that homelessness is a factor that contributes to children's
risk of involvement in commercial sexual exploitation).
32. See GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7, at 5; see also Amanda Kloer, Sex Trafficking and
HIVIAIDS: A Deadly Junction for Women and Girls, 37 Hum. RTS. 8, 9 (2010) (de-
tailing the factors that contribute to risks of disease exposure for young people
who are exploited).
33. Sheila Kershaw, Gender, Abuse and the Prostitution of Young People, in CHILD
SEXUAL ASSAULT 52, 56 (Pat Cox, Sheila Kershaw & Joy Trotter eds., 2010).
10
30: 1 2011
CONSENT, COERCION, AND COMPASSION
trafficking victims can experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a
result of this abuse.34
Females are reported to compose the vast majority of targets for this indus-
try both internationally and domestically.3 The federal law that aims to elimi-
nate sexual exploitation and trafficking, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
of 2000 (TVPA), identifies women and girls as the predominate victims of the
sex industry?6 Within the United States, estimates reporting the gender break-
down of commercially sexually exploited youth vary; however, the most recent
arrest data indicates that females accounted for 76% of juvenile prostitution ar-
rests in the United States.37 In comparison, females accounted for only 30% of
juvenile arrests as a whole?8 While females compose the majority of juveniles
arrested for prostitution, male youth still account for nearly a quarter of the
children arrested for and victimized by commercial sexual exploitation, which
is not insignificant. Moreover, male youth engaging in acts of prostitution are
34. The National Institute of Mental Health defines post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) as "an anxiety disorder that some people get after seeing or living through
a dangerous event." Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), NAT'L INSTITUTEs HEALTH (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/publications/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd/complete-index.shtml.
Traumatic events that may trigger PTSD include physical and sexual assault or
abuse. Id.; see Angela A. Jones, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Victims of
Human Sex Trafficking: A Perpetuation of Chronic Indignity, 4 INTERCULTURAL
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 317, 327-28 (noting the presence of PTSD among victims of sex
trafficking); see also Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter & Jose Hidalgo, Human
Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim Protection Beyond Prosecution
Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 379, 382 (2005) ("Anxiety, insomnia, depres-
sion, and post-traumatic stress disorder are common psychological manifesta-
tions among trafficked victims."); Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits
of a Public Health Law Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REv. 447, 464
(2011) (noting the prevalence of symptoms consistent with PTSD among women
who were victims of sex trafficking).
35. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2) (2oo6).
36. Id. § 7101(b)(2), (4) (noting that, globally, traffickers "primarily target women and
girls, who are disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to educa-
tion, chronic unemployment, discrimination, and the lack of economic oppor-
tunities in countries of origin").
37. See Puzzanchera, supra note 22, at 1, 3; see also Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests
2004, Juv. JUsT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 1, 2 (reporting
that, in 2004, 72% of juvenile arrests for prostitution were of females); see also
Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra note 19, at 24 (reporting that an independent
2005 survey found that 90% of juvenile prostitution arrests were of females). Find-
ings from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reflect data
that is reported by local law enforcement agencies from across the country to the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. See Puzzanchera, supra note 22, at 1.
38. See Puzzanchera, supra note 22, at 3.
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more difficult to account for because they are more likely than girls to act alone,
rather than under a pimp arranging their exploitation, and to form protection
groups among their peers.39 Conversely, most female youth subject to domestic
sex trafficking are connected to a pimp,40 and some data indicates that this fig-
ure is as high as 75%.41 While this Article mainly focuses on girls due to their
higher arrest rate, exploited male youth-and specifically those identifying as
homosexual, who are more likely to encounter problems in the juvenile justice
system 4 2-are also of considerable importance in this discussion. 43 Policy
discussions about commercial sexual exploitation are incomplete without stud-
ying their needs. 44
B. The Illusion of Choice and the Reality of Coercion
The continued prosecution of children for prostitution seems to inherently
reject evidence that they are often forced into their exploitation when they are
prostituted or threatened such that it appears to them that they have no way
39. See GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7, at 3 (citing YOUTH ADVOCATE PROGRAM INT'L,
CHILDREN FOR SALE: YOUTH INVOLVED IN PROSTITUTION, PORNOGRAPHY, AND
SEX TRAFFICKING 1 (1998)).
40. See Finkelhor & Ormrod, supra note 17, at 9; see also GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7,
at 4.
41. ESTES & WEINER, supra note 19, at 7.
42. Gay youth are more likely to encounter harassment and other problems when
subjected to detention. Valerie Gwinn, Locked in the Closet: The Impact of
Lawrence v. Texas on the Lives of Gay Youth in the Juvenile Justice System,
6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 437, 442 (2007); Peter A. Hahn, Note, The
Kids Are Not Alright: Addressing Discriminatory Treatment of Queer Youth in Juve-
nile Detention and Correctional Facilities, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, u8-19 (2004).
Girls have been affected in the justice system by preconceptions of acceptable be-
havior assigned to them based on gender stereotypes, see supra Section I.C; simi-
larly, gay male youth experience bias for not conforming to gender expectations
for males. See generally Gwinn, supra (discussing documented experiences of bias
toward gay youth in the juvenile justice system).
43. RANDI FEINSTEIN ET AL., JUSTICE FOR ALL?: A REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEX-
UAL AND TRANSGENDERED YOUTH IN THE NEW YORK JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
40-41 (2001) (discussing the staff and service needs of gay youth in the New York
juvenile justice system); see Terry Coonan, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act:
A Work in Progress, I INTERCULTURAL Hum. RTS. L. REV. 99, 119 (20o6) (noting
that it is imperative to recognize that men and boys are also victims of traffick-
ing).
44. A disproportionate number of commercially sexually exploited male youth
self-identify as gay, bisexual, or transgender/transsexual. See ESTES & WEINER,
supra note 19, at 7-8.
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out.45 When exploited youth appear resistant to intervention by authority
figures, it can also influence the perception that they are less worthy of protec-
tion and should instead be prosecuted.46 But empirical research and patterns
identified by law enforcement officials illustrate how traffickers and pimps tar-
get vulnerable children, groom them, and recruit them into prostitution. Often,
this process involves the use of violence, abduction, deception, and coercion.4 7
Typically a trafficker, also referred to as a "third-party exploiter" or pimp,
ensnares young females by using a process that destroys the child's sense of per-
sonal identity by gradually breaking her down. Pimps first seek out young girls
at bus stations, shelters, malls, arcades, and on the Internet, preying on those
who appear vulnerable.4' A pimp will first act as a "boyfriend," promising love
and a better life while playing on a young girl's previously identified vulnera-
bilities.49 Gradually, when a pimp introduces a young girl into prostitution, she
45. Cf Cheryl Hanna, Somebody's Daughter, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2002)
(discussing the perception that domestic minors exposed to sexual exploitation
are not victims, and noting that they are often blamed for their own situation).
46. Cf id. at 26-27 ("The mistaken societal attitude that prostituted children are
somehow responsible for their exploitation and, therefore, are unworthy of the
protection the law affords to other victims of child sexual abuse does nothing to
alter this view. Attachment to their pimps and resulting non-cooperation from
victimized children create untold difficulties at the investigation stage." (citations
omitted)).
47. Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Child Prostitution,
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/
prostitution.html (citing ESTES & WEINER, supra note 19, at 11-12); see, e.g.,
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 149 (testimony of Tina
Frundt, Founder and Exec. Dir. of Courtney's House, which is a residential pro-
gram designed specifically to serve girls who were involved in prostitution). A
survivor of child prostitution herself, Frundt shared her account of being "gang
raped, psychologically manipulated, sold for sex, and beaten" to ensure her com-
pliance. After her arrest, she spent a year in juvenile detention without counseling
or treatment and with no referrals for services upon her release. Id.; see also CUR-
TIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 47-48 (describing interviews with prostituted youth
detailing the daily violence that they experienced at the hands of customers,
pimps, and other youth, including stories of "being kidnapped and held hostage
by customers").
48. ALBANESE, supra note ii, at 3; see also CURTIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 47 (quoting
adolescents who were approached by pimps outside of shelters and group homes);
ESTES & WEINER, supra note 19, at 58.
49. See Kershaw, supra note 33, at 58; see also United States v. Williams, 428 F. App'x
134, 139, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing how the defendants, acting as pimps, de-
liberately sought "lost girls," and finding that they purposely chose and targeted
particularly vulnerable youth to exploit); Exploiting Americans on American Soil:
Domestic Trafficking Exposed: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. & Cooperation in
Eur., lo9th Cong. 22-23 (2005) [hereinafter Exploiting Americans on American Soil
Hearing]; ALBANESE, supra note n1, at 5 (noting that promises of a better life are a
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fails to recognize that she is a victim and becomes trapped. 0 Many factors can
prevent a young girl from realizing that she is being exploited or from recogniz-
ing the dangers that she faces," including age, lack of knowledge or experience,
previous abuse, the need for attention, previous poor judgment, and, in some
cases, learning disabilities and similar limitations." To ensure control over
young girls, traffickers often use a process analogous to "grooming," the
well-documented approach that is employed by people who sexually abuse
children. 3 The behavior is also similar to that employed by batterers who con-
trol their victims through isolation, economic dependence, and physical and
verbal abuse.54 Research suggests that pimps and traffickers are fully aware of
the process they employ to manipulate or initiate children.55 As one convicted
trafficker chillingly described, "With young girls, you promise them heaven,
and they'll follow you to hell.""6
common recruitment tool employed by pimps and that, once exploited, children
are often "threatened and assaulted to ensure obedience and prevent escape").
50. See Kershaw, supra note 33, at 58; see also Exploiting Americans on American Soil
Hearing, supra note 49, at 69-70; GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.
51. Kershaw, supra note 33, at 56.
52. GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.
53. See Kershaw, supra note 33, at 58; see also Urbina, supra note 2, at Al ("For those
not already engaged in survival sex, the grooming process was gradual and calcu-
lated. . .. Before long, the girl is asked to turn occasional tricks to help pay bills.").
54. Wendi J. Adelson, Child Prostitute or Victim of Trafficking?, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
96, 126 (2008).
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing common recruitment tools
to find the most vulnerable youth and approaches by those persons referred to as
pimps or traffickers).
56. Urbina, supra note 2, at Ai. "The goal is to get the girls as dependent as possible.
According to one ex-pimp, 'Mentally you've gotta burn into their brains you're
the only one-you're god. Once you've got that down and they're ready to
work... then you instill the fear-the wrath of god. If they mess up, there's a
price to pay, and they know it's a heavy price."' Rosalind Bentley & Richard
Meryhew, Turning Girls into Prostitutes Is an Easy Task, Experts Say, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Aug. 15, 1999, at iB; see also, e.g., CURTIS ET AL., supra note
30, at 48 (quoting one youth who stated, "I fell in love with this guy and thought
he was the one ... and he called himself a pimp. But he always told me I'm his
Bottom Bitch and whatever. He put me on the stroll, out there with black eyes and
broken noses. I was out there messed up." (citation omitted)). The term "bottom
bitch" or "bottom girl" refers to a pimp's "most senior prostitute, who often
trains new prostitutes and collects their earnings until they can be trusted."
United States v. Brooks, 61o F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2oo) (explaining the mean-
ing of the term "bottom girl" as described in expert testimony in a sex trafficking
prosecution against a pimp who exploited minors).
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As a result of this careful manipulation, victims of commercial sexual
exploitation often display symptoms of "traumatic bonding"-more commonly
known as Stockholm syndrome-which makes it difficult for them to separate
themselves from the person responsible for their harm.17 Just as victims of
domestic and family violence may stay with their abuser, victims who are
coerced into prostitution are often caught in the same dangerous pattern.58 A
hierarchy of prostitutes developed by a pimp is designed to function as a kind
of surrogate "family" for the girls who work for him.59 This formation makes it
challenging for girls to break away from the situation, creating a kind of psy-
chological paralysis, even though an outsider would recognize the ongoing
57. Stockholm syndrome, originally used in the context of hostage situations, occurs
when a victim develops an emotional attachment to his or her captor. See Natha-
lie De Fabrique, Understanding Stockholm Syndrome, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.
(Fed. Bureau of Investigation, D.C.), July 1, 2007, at 1, 11. The FBI has described
Stockholm syndrome as a "paradoxical psychological phenomenon wherein a
positive bond between hostage and captor occurs that appears irrational in light
of the frightening ordeal endured by the victims." Id. Research has shown that
other groups, including people coerced into prostitution or otherwise subjected
to physical or sexual abuse, can exhibit these symptoms even if they do not qualify
as having the syndrome. See Shirley Julich, Stockholm Syndrome and Child Sexual
Abuse, 14 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 107, 108-09 (2005). Factors that contribute to
the development of traumatic bonding occur when: (I) The victim perceives a
threat to his or her survival and believes that the captor will carry out that threat;
(2) the victim perceives some small kindness from the captor; (3) the victim is iso-
lated from perspectives other than those of the captor; and (4) the victim perce-
ives an inability to escape the situation. See id. at 112 (citing DEE L.R. GRAHAM
WITH EDNA I. RAWLINGS & ROBERTA K. RIGSBY, LOVING To SURVIVE: SEXUAL
TERROR, MEN'S VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN'S LIVES (1994)); see also U.S. HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2009), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/trafficking/campaign-kits/tool kitsocial/child-victims
.pdf (stating that trafficked youth experience traumatic bonding); Natasha Ko-
recki, Operation Targets Child Prostitution, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at 15
(quoting Gregg Wing, FBI Supervisor of Crimes Against Children in Chicago,
who noted the presence of Stockholm syndrome symptoms among child victims
discovered in law enforcement efforts to combat the domestic sex trafficking of
minors); Jessica Lustig, The 13-Year-Old Prostitute: Working Girl or Sex Slave?,
N.Y. MAG., Apr. 9, 2007, at 36.
58. See Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must
Not Know in Order To Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly,
18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 125 (2oo6); Kershaw, supra note 33, at 58.
59. GRAGG ET AL., supra note 7, at 46.
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abuse.6 o If a girl does try to leave, she will usually endure physical violence as a
result.'
The sophistication of the criminal enterprises run by pimps or other
third-party exploiters varies. Yet research shows that many pimps involved with
youth are known to law enforcement agencies and often are affiliated with
gangs or other forms of organized crime." Experts, law enforcement officials,
and media reports cite gangs and organized crime as being extensively involved
in the commercial sexual exploitation of youth.6 3 Some law enforcement offi-
60. Id. at 46; see also Hotaling, Miller & Trudeau, supra note 26, at 186 (describing a
psychological paralysis that can cause victims to "feel unable to escape prostitu-
tion, even when offered other opportunities").
61. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 126 (statement of Francey
Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdiction,
Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.) (testifying that attempted escapes by the
child often result in brutal beatings or even death).
62. See Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra note 19, at 25. The National Juvenile Pros-
titution study, conducted by the Crimes Against Children Research Center of the
University of New Hampshire and funded by grants from the U.S. Department of
Justice, revealed that in cases in which pimps were identified in connection with
children arrested for prostitution, 41% of the pimps were reportedly affiliated with
larger organized enterprises, such as gangs, or businesses, or websites. Id. In the
other 59% of those cases, the pimp appeared to be operating independently and
exploiting one, two, or three girls. Id. The same study examined the available
arrest histories of those who were detained for trafficking or prostituting youth
and found criminal histories that included sexual offenses, drug and weapons
charges, theft, homicide, and other violent offenses, sometimes in combination
with each other. Id. at 29.
63. ALBANESE, supra note n, at 5 (noting the presence of local, regional, national, and
international organized networks trafficking in children); Karen Zraick, Eight
Charged in Brooklyn in Sex-Trafficking Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 201o, at A28 (dis-
cussing an investigation into the trafficking of about fifteen girls who were alle-
gedly forced into prostitution by members of a gang). The article also quotes
Charles Hynes, the District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn, who stated that
increased gang involvement in the trade of women for prostitution had resulted
in the creation of a special Sex Trafficking Unit within the District Attorney's
Office. Id. According to FBI Deputy Assistant Director Daniel Roberts, "Some of
these networks of pimps and their organizations are very sophisticated, they're
interstate, requiring wiretaps and undercover sting operations to bring charges."
Child Prostitutes Rescued by FBI, Police, CBSNEWS, (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www
.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/o2/23/national/main4821773.shtml; see also James
Walsh, David Chanen & Allie Shah, 29 Charged with Sex Trafficking, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 9, 2010, at iA. (describing a federal law enforcement
sweep involving gang members who were allegedly forcing girls into prostitution).
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cials suggest that gangs have shifted from drugs to prostitution because "selling
girls" is "just as lucrative but far less risky."6 4
Youth are often sold into sexual exploitation on street corners but are also
sold through other means such as escort and massage services, private dancing
clubs, conventions, and major sporting events."' In addition, the Internet now
plays a growing role in both the recruitment of girls and the marketing to cus-
tomers. 6 It allows organized crime operations and individuals to advertise girls
and solicit clients in a way that more easily eludes detection.6 7 Online advertis-
ing also increases the minors' isolation from the public's view because they are
not seen on the street or in a public place or business.68
Unfortunately, the pattern of violence and coercion is practically universal
in the commercial sexual exploitation of youth. Patterns of manipulation and
abuse of young people who are exploited are reported repeatedly as more
information about this topic comes to light.9 What may start off as a promise
of a better life by a pimp or trafficker quickly turns to threats and violence, leav-
64. Urbina, supra note 2, at Ai; see also Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra
note 6, at 144 (testimony of Ernie Allen, President and CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing
& Exploited Children) (noting that "organized crime is drawn to this illicit indus-
try because it offers relatively low risk and high profit").
65. ESTES & WEINER, supra note 19, at 6o. For example, in cases where law enforce-
ment officials identified a pimp or other third-party trafficker involved in com-
mercial sexual exploitation, transactions took place not only on the streets but
also through escort services (26%), at massage parlors (9%), and over the Internet
(20%). Mitchell, Finkelhor & Wolak, supra note 19, at 26.
66. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 137 (statement of Ernie
Allen, President and CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children) (noting
that offenders "don't just parade these children on city streets anymore" but can
solicit "clients" on the Internet who can purchase the children from home or a
hotel). In particular, Craigslist came under fire in recent years for its inclusion of
an "Erotic Services" section. See Claire Cain Miller, Craigslist Says It Has Shut Its
Section for Sex Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at Bi (noting the role of online ads
on Craigslist and other Internet sites in child sexual exploitation).
67. The use of Internet ads lessens the risk of arrest for men buying sex with children
because the transactions can be more difficult for law enforcement officials to
detect since they are organized outside of public view. See Domestic Minor Sex
Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 145 (statement of Ernie Allen, President and
CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children).
68. Id.
69. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 126 (statement of
Francey Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdic-
tion, Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.); Lustig, supra note 57, at 36 (describing
the abuse that children suffer at the hands of their pimps as reported by legal ad-
vocates and children); Susan Saulny, Hundreds Seized in Sweep Against Child Pros-
titution, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 20o8, at Ai6; Urbina, supra note 2, at Al (discussing
common themes of abuse and violence among children who are prostituted).
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ing girls even more isolated from any sources of support that they may have
had. Soon, they are fully reliant on their abusers and forced to endure coercive
conduct and physical abuse.7o Similarly, depending on the age of the minor,
most instances of sexual exploitation are also considered statutory rape under
relevant state laws. Yet, despite coercion and abuse, the most common response
from law enforcement agencies is to pursue prosecution and detention of the
youth for prostitution.'
C. The Gender Implications of Prosecution
Broader issues of gender, sexuality, and the law are integral to this discus-
sion for several reasons. First, gender biases are relevant to any discussion about
why states prosecute girls when the same act that causes the prosecution is also
considered statutory rape. Next, young girls are prosecuted at reportedly higher
rates than even the men who exploit them.72 The problem of "blaming the vic-
tim"" in rape cases is analogous to the prosecution of girls who are coerced into
70. In Our Own Backyard: Child Prostitution & Sex Trafficking: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law, ith Cong. 14 (2010) (hereinafter
Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Hearing] (statement of Rachel Lloyd, Exec.
Dir. and Founder, Girls Educ. & Mentoring Servs.); see also Press Release, U.S.
Att'y's Office for the Dist. of Md., Maryland U.S. Attorney's Office Implements Attor-
ney General's New National Strategy To Prevent Child Exploitation (Aug. 5, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/md/PublicAffairs/press-releases/presso8/
MarylandUSAOlmplementsAttorneyGeneralsNewStrategytoPreventChild
Exploitation.html) (describing a recent federal prosecution of a pimp that illu-
strates the most common pattern of manipulation and abuse).
71. See LINDA A. SMITH, SAMANTHA HEALY VARDAMAN & MELISSA A. SNOw, SHARED
HOPE INT'L, The NATIONAL REPORT ON DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING:
AMERICA'S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN, at v (2009), available at http://www
.sharedhope.org/Portals/o/Documents/SHI NationalReport onDMSTh2009.pdf;
Adelson, supra note 54, at 97 (showing that nearly every state allows for the prose-
cution of youth for prostitution); Bob Herbert, The Wrong Target, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2008, at A25; Law Project, ENDING CHILD PROSTITUTION
& TRAFFICKING-USA, http://www.ecpatusa.org/what-we-do/helping-children-in
-america/law-project/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (noting that police are likely to
treat exploited youth as prostitution offenders, perpetuating the cycle of arrest
and detention of youth); see also, e.g., Lustig, supra note 57, at 5 (discussing a case
in which a thirteen-year-old girl who had been arrested for prostitution bravely
testified against her abusive pimps to a grand jury but was shortly thereafter sent
to a juvenile detention facility on her fourteenth birthday).
72. See Hanna, supra note 45, at 26-27; Moira Heiges, Note, From the Inside Out:
Reforming State and Local Prostitution Enforcement To Combat Sex Trafficking in
the United States and Abroad, 94 MINN. L. REV. 428, 437-38 (2009).
73. In blame-the-victim cases, if a woman's "pre-rape behavior violated traditional
norms of female prudence or morality, many people blame her instead of the
rapist." David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
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commercial sexual exploitation. Specifically, the idea that a rape victim "in-
vited" the crime due to her behavior or lifestyle is similar to the argument that
girls who are sold for sex choose their exploitation. In both instances, the sexual
act committed-rape or statutory rape-is illegal, regardless of the extraneous
behavior of the victim.
The law's failure to recognize commercially exploited girls as victims is
related to society's different social norms regarding girls' and boys' sexuality.
Scholars note that men and boys are "expected, if not encouraged, to engage in
sex whenever the opportunity presents itself."74 Girls, in contrast, are expected
to be chaste or to "use any strategy to avoid sexual intercourse."75 Just as these
social norms deterred progress in laws that address rape and sexual assault in
other arenas, they have arguably prevented progress in laws that affect traf-
ficked youth. The lack of progress toward a better solution underscores under-
lying prejudices or cultural assumptions that "good girls" who are worthy of
protection would not accept payment for their own exploitation and would
somehow escape. Furthermore, these laws arguably stem from an assumption
that if girls were truly victimized, they would quickly acquiesce to and coope-
rate with authorities once encountered7' However, these beliefs overlook the
reality that coercive forces exacerbate young girls' lack of trust in law enforce-
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1196 (1997). In the past, criminologists have noted
the problem of "victim-blaming" in the development of rape law in the United
States. Id. at 1196. Cf ZSUZSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 17 (1987) (discussing
institutional sexism wherein, historically, legal institutions subjected victims of
rape to the argument that their behavior caused the crimes against them, known
as "victim precipitation"). Victims were often blamed and endured the acquittal
of their rapists by the criminal justice process. Id.; see also Michelle Oberman,
Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 703, 710-11 (2000) (stating that victim-blaming remained a "signifi-
cant problem" in the late 199os, even after legal reforms sought to remedy prob-
lematic features of the common law governing rape by removing the requirement
of proof of resistance by the victim and disallowing jury instructions that
cautioned about the "ease of making false accusations").
74. Oberman, supra note 73, at 715 (arguing that men are conditioned "to
single-mindedly go after sexual intercourse with a female, regardless of how they
do it"); see also Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663,
675-84 (1999); Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of Sex-Role
Socialization to Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME
75 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991).
75. Oberman, supra note 73, at 715 (citing Warshaw & Parrot, supra note 74, at 75).
76. See Hanna, supra note 45, at 26-27, for a related discussion about the relationship
between the criminalization of girls' behavior, the role of social condemnation
against girls, the lack of understanding about their needs, and the lack of
enforcement against the men who exploit them.
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ment and social services, and that attachment to their pimps is caused by com-
plex psychosocial factors?7
Indeed, the current failure to explicitly acknowledge the coercive nature of
youth prostitution-regardless of the exchange of money-represents a conflict
in our legal jurisprudence. Most state laws implicitly recognize the coercive
nature of sexual activity with a minor through their statutory rape laws'7 creat-
ing a tension with the continued prosecution of prostituted girls.
The prosecution and punishment of youth-primarily girls-for prostitu-
tion stems from practices developed in the early years of the juvenile and crimi-
nal justice systems. Girls were often prosecuted and detained for behaviors that
carried negative social stigmas, including sexual activity. Almost all girls who
appeared in family court during its early years were charged with "immorality
or waywardness," with the former potentially including evidence of sexual
intercourse.79 The sanctions were severe in that girls were more likely than boys
to be sent to "reformatories" for this behavior.o The juvenile justice system's
dual concerns with "adolescent criminality and moral conduct" reflect a
"unique and intense preoccupation" with girls' sexuality and their obedience to
"parental authority.""1 For example, noncriminal status offense statutes, which
include habitual truancy, running away from home or residential care, and gen-
eral "incorrigibility," are used to detain girls at a higher rate than boys." This
has a disproportionate effect on minority girls, who are overrepresented in the
juvenile detention population."
77. Often, as part of the acculturation process, girls associated with pimps are taught
to evade and mistrust law enforcement. See, e.g., Jennifer McKim, People Need To
Know What These Guys Have Done, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2010, at 1.
78. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
79. See John A. MacDonald & Meda Chesney-Lind, Gender Bias and Juvenile Justice
Revisited: A Multiyear Analysis, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 174 (2001).
8o. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Paul E. Tracy, Kimberly Kempf-Leonard & Stephanie Abramoske-James,
Gender Differences in Delinquency and Juvenile Justice Processing: Evidence from
National Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 201-02, 210 (2009) (documenting the
disproportionate effects based on gender and concluding that "girls are much
more likely than boys to receive the harshest sanction available in juvenile court-
namely, commitment to juvenile prison-for status offenses and even for tech-
nical violations of probation").
83. AM. BAR Ass'N & NAT'L BAR Ass'N, JUSTICE BY GENDER: THE LACK OF APPRO-
PRIATE PREVENTION, DIVERSION AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR GIRLS IN
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-17, 19-21 (2001), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal-justice-section-newsletter/crimjust
juvjus-justicebygenderweb.pdf (discussing how girls are disproportionately
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These same themes persist today and are perpetuated when lawmakers fail
to change laws that allow for the prosecution of exploited youth. Girls in gener-
al continue to be detained for behaviors that would not lead to detention for
boys, like running away.4 Female youth may also receive court interventions
that are generally longer, harsher, and more restrictive than those given to their
male counterparts." Scholars and practitioners attribute this treatment to pa-
ternalism among decision makers, fear of adolescent girls' expressions of sex-
uality, and efforts to protect girls from further sexual victimization." Opposi-
tion to reforming prosecution of exploited youth is often grounded in the same
notion that girls need to be prosecuted for their own "protection"-that is, to
keep them from further victimization.17 However, these arguments are perpe-
tuated without a strong relationship to the reality of girls' experiences in deten-
tion and with the juvenile justice system more broadly."
D. The Relationship Between Adolescent Consent and Autonomy
Questions about mental capacity and an adolescent's ability to consent to
sex give rise to complex tensions within advocacy communities, such as femin-
ists, which one might otherwise expect to mobilize against the prosecution of
children for prostitution. An adolescent's ability (or lack of ability) to consent
to sex in the context of prostitution implicates broader issues of adolescent
autonomy.'9 As a result, some activists may have concern that arguments about
whether a minor can consent to sex in the context of prostitution may affect the
legal ability of youth to make decisions in other areas implicating issues of au-
tonomy, such as choices about reproductive health, access to birth control, or
early emancipation,9 o or sexual behavior amongst peers. Some scholars suggest
84. See SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 17.
85. See Tracy, Kempf-Leonard & Abramoske-James, supra note 82, at 18o.
86. See SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 17. Other reasons that girls are detained include
"obtainfing] services for girls with significant needs; ... fear of teen pregnancy
and its societal costs; . . . [and] intolerance of girls who are non-cooperative and
non-compliant." Id.; see also Tracy, Kempf-Leonard & Abramoske-James, supra
note 82, at 180.
87. See infra Subsection II.A.i.
88. See infra notes 132-136 and accompanying text; cf SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 23-28
(documenting the poor conditions for girls in detention).
89. Hanna, supra note 45, at 5-6; see, e.g., Jessica R. Arons, Misconceived Laws: The
Irrationality of Parental Involvement Requirements for Contraception, 41 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 1093 (2000).
90. For example, Title X of the Public Service Health Act, addressing federal family
planning, provides federal funds to organizations to provide for improvements in
maternal and infant health, lower the incidence of unintended pregnancy, reduce
the incidence of abortion, and lower rates of sexually transmitted diseases. 42
U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (2oo6 & Supp. 2010); see also 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a) (2010). Since
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that the lack of progress toward reform for girls who are prosecuted for prosti-
tution has been affected by a division within the feminist community about
consent issues and the legality of prostitution in general.9 '
Because of the way these issues interrelate, advocacy groups and courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, have grappled with the tensions in treatment of
adolescents and adolescents' mental capacity and decision making in different
legal contexts.92 These tensions were acutely demonstrated in two Supreme
Court cases in which the American Psychological Association (APA) weighed in
as an amicus. In the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons,93 the APA argued that, in the
context of a capital murder trial, minors are not as developmentally mature as
the time it was passed in 1970, the government has required that projects sup-
ported under the Act provide for pregnant individuals regardless of their age. Id.
§ 59.5(a)(4). Courts have also held that parental consent cannot be required as a
condition to access of services by adolescents. See, e.g., Cnty. of St. Charles v. Mo.
Family Health Council, 107 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 859
(1997); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1oo, loo6
(D. Utah 1983). However, at times, legislators have attempted to require parental
consent that would limit the ability of an adolescent to consent on her own to re-
ceive care. For example, in 1998, the Parental Notification Act was passed by the
House of Representatives and would have required a minor's parents to be noti-
fied before the minor could receive contraceptive drugs or devices from projects
supported by Title X funds, Parental Notification Act of 1998, H.R. 4721, 105th
Cong.; however, the Act did not become law. A similar measure had been
defeated in 1978. See 124 CONG. REC. 37,044 (1978); see also Michele Goodwin &
Naomi Duke, Capacity and Autonomy: A Thought Experiment on Minors' Access to
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 34 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 503, 537-43 (2011) (dis-
cussing reproductive health care debates about adolescents and their consent to
services).
91. See Hanna, supra note 45, at 5 (noting that prostitution has traditionally "divided
feminist scholars and activists," and that feminists have "shied away from the...
question of the legal status of child sex workers" because there is "no agreement
on what the legal status of adult commercial sex work" should be); see, e.g.,
Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law
Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992).
92. See generally Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehen-
sive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, io U.C. DAVIS
J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 275, 285-363 (2006) (discussing controversies about the capacity
of children to make decisions in differing legal contexts and identifying ways to
treat them consistently); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying
an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265 (2000); Kimberly M. Mutcherson,
Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence
in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927 (2006)
(discussing tensions related to adolescents' competence to make decisions about
their health care as compared to their ability to be criminally culpable).
93. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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adults and are thus less blameworthy for their criminal actions. 94 However, fif-
teen years earlier, the APA had argued in Hodgson v. Minnesota5 that adoles-
cents possess the same mental capability and maturity as adults to make repro-
ductive health decisions about birth control and abortion.96 When the Court
made its landmark decision in Roper to abolish the death penalty for juveniles,
scientific data about adolescent development cited by the APA played a crucial
role.17 However, the APA faced criticism in Justice Scalia's dissent, as it was
accused of "flip-flopping" because of its prior assertions in Hodgson.98 Justice
Scalia specifically noted the APA's seemingly contradictory positions and the
fact that other groups questioned the validity of the APA's arguments.99
In this way, the argument that youth cannot legally consent due to imma-
turity and lack of capacity in one area-such as prostitution-invites the argu-
ment that they are not capable of decision making or consent in other areas.'
However, commercial sexual exploitation can be distinguished from other con-
94. See Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, & the Missouri Psychological
Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447.
95. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
96. Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Ass'n, National Ass'n of
Social Workers Inc., & the American Jewish Committee in Support of Petition-
ers/Cross-Respondents in Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309 and in Support of Appellees in
No. 88-805 at 18-21, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-1125,
88-1309), Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (No. 88-805),
1989 WL 1127529 [hereinafter APA Hodgson Brief].
97. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
98. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe American Psychological
Association (APA), which claims in this case that scientific evidence shows per-
sons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions, has
previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court." (citing
APA Hodgson Brief)); Cunningham, supra note 92, at 309-10. But see Laurence
Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors' Access to Abor-
tion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop", 64 AM. Psy-
CHOLOGIST 583, 586 (2009) (reconciling the APA's position on youth access to
abortion with its position on eligibility for the death penalty based upon impor-
tant distinctions between psychosocial and cognitive maturity).
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Mutcherson, supra note 92, at
927-28 (noting the tension in the arguments). But see Steinberg et al., supra note
98, at 586 (reconciling the seemingly contradictory positions).
oo. See, e.g., Mutcherson, supra note 92, at 928; Steinberg et al., supra note 98, at 584
(noting that, when responding to the APA's request for an endorsement of its
amicus brief, the Executive Committee of the Society for Research of Adolescence
raised concerns that adolescent autonomy could be threatened based upon a
misinterpretation of arguments that adolescents are less blameworthy); Cynthia
Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429,
433-37 (2006).
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texts involving juvenile decision making for two reasons. First, cognitive and
psychosocial development occur along independent tracks for adolescents."o'
This can have varying effects on decision making, depending on the type of
event at issue and the presence of pressure or coercion.o 2 Therefore, just as the
Supreme Court distinguished the types of adolescent reasoning at issue in
Hodgson and Roper, so too can one distinguish a minor's inability to "consent"
in the context of sexual exploitation from other areas of decision making that
rely on cognitive, rather than psychosocial, capacities. Second, research and
some laws acknowledge the implicit and explicit coercion of children in the sex
trafficking industry. This sets commercial sexual exploitation apart from other
situations in which an adolescent may make a decision in the absence of coer-
cion. Our legal policies should be sufficiently nuanced to recognize the scientif-
ic and practical distinctions surrounding adolescent decision making. The inhe-
rent coercion in the trafficking of minors distinguishes it from other contexts in
which juveniles may be able to safely make decisions. Therefore, concerns about
other policies that apply to adolescents need not stymie reform addressing
prosecution of minors. This is particularly true given that federal law recognizes
that selling minors for sex is inherently coercive.
II. THE PROSECUTION OF CHILDREN FOR PROSTITUTION AND RELATED LAWS
The practice of prosecuting minors for prostitution conflicts in two major
ways with other laws relating to minors.0 3 First, prosecuting prostituted youth
ioi. See generally Steinberg et al., supra note 98, for a thorough discussion of these
principles of adolescent brain development.
102. See Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and Ju-
venile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493 (2009); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A.
Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 321, 328 (2006); Steinberg et al., supra note 98.
103. These conflicts and related issues have been discussed by other scholars as well,
though there is scarce discussion and analysis of recent legislative and judicial de-
velopments. Examples of such discussion relating to these conflicts include,
among others, Adelson, supra note 54, at 97; Tamar Birckhead, The Youngest
Profession: Consent, Autonomy, and Prostituted Youth, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055,
1095-96 (2011); Geneva 0. Brown, Little Girl Lost: Las Vegas Metro Police Vice Divi-
sion and the Use of Material Witness Holds Against Teenaged Prostitutes, 57 CATH.
U. L. REV. 471, 502-05 (2oo8); Hanna, supra note 45, at 2-7; Hotaling, Miller &
Trudeau, supra note 26, at 187; Nesheba Kittling, God Bless the Child: The United
States' Response to Domestic Juvenile Prostitution, 6 NEV. L.J. 913, 920-22 (2006);
Christianna M. Lamb, The Child Witness and the Law: The United States' Judicial
Response to the Commercial, Sexual Exploitation of Children in Light of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 OR. REV. INT'L L. 63, 81-84 (2001); and
Shelby Schwartz, Note, Harboring Concerns: The Problematic Conceptual Reorien-
tation ofJuvenile Prostitution Adjudication in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
235, 253-60 (20o8). Outside of scholarly circles, however, these conflicts have final-
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directly opposes the theory underlying statutory rape laws. Because these
statutes implicitly recognize that minors cannot legally consent to sex with
adults, prosecuting a minor for accepting money in conjunction with the very
sex act that is considered statutory rape is inherently contradictory. Second, the
prosecution of domestic minors perpetuates a dichotomy between domes-
tic-born and foreign-born victims of sex trafficking. Although sexually
exploited children may endure similar exploitative acts regardless of birthplace,
they encounter different treatment under the law.'0 4 While the response of au-
thorities is changing at the national level,'o states have been slower to follow
suit. Therefore, in addition to conflicts within state laws regarding consent and
statutory rape, the prosecution of domestically trafficked youth under state law
contradicts federal law and international protocols on human trafficking.o'
This Part will examine each contradiction in turn, beginning with a critical
analysis of current prosecution practices.
A. Prosecution for Prostitution in Juvenile Courts
All states criminalize prostitution, except parts of Nevada.'07 In addition,
states incorporate their penal codes into their juvenile court or family court
statutes."os This incorporation subjects juveniles to essentially the same penal
code provisions as adults-meaning that juveniles can be charged with prosti-
tution and other offenses-though juveniles face different penalty schemes
depending on each state's juvenile laws.
ly gained increased attention by advocacy groups like Shared Hope International
and the Polaris Project.
104. See Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 70, at 14-16 (state-
ment of Rachel Lloyd, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Girls Educ. & Mentoring Servs.); see
also infra Subsection II.C.i.
105. See infra Section II.C (discussing the TVPA and the Federal Innocence Lost Initia-
tive).
io6. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7103, 7105, 71o6
(2oo6); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 44 th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167 (NOV. 20, 1989).
107. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201-354 (2010) (criminalizing prostitution and solicitation
only when it occurs outside of a licensed facility); Nicole A. Hough, Sodomy and
Prostitution: Laws Protecting the "Fabric of Society", 3 PIERCE L. REV. 101, 113-14
(2004).
io8. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2oo8) (defining a juvenile de-
linquent as "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age, who, having
committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, (a) is
not criminally responsible for such conduct by reason of infancy, or (b) is the
defendant in an action ordered removed from a criminal court to the family court
pursuant to ... the criminal procedure law").
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The majority of states retain juvenile court jurisdiction until age eigh-
teen.o9 In only two states are sixteen-year-olds always tried as adults, regardless
of the offense.' A juvenile who is adjudicated for the crime of prostitution,
typically a Class B misdemeanor,"' is then subject to disposition, the equivalent
of sentencing in the adult context. In ordering dispositions, a juvenile court
judge has discretion to issue a range of alternatives;" 2 however, in some areas,
prostitution is one of the few offenses for which the detention rate at disposi-
tion is nearly loo%."3 The common use of detention for prostitution misde-
meanor cases is reminiscent of the early days of the juvenile court and its preoc-
cupation with regulating the sexual behavior of young females and punishing
behavior viewed by society as "immoral.""4 Recognizing this entrenched think-
ing in the modern juvenile justice system is helpful to understanding why
reforms of the current practice have proven difficult.
i. Addressing Arguments in Favor of the Prosecution of Minors for
Prostitution
Those who favor prosecuting youth for prostitution are not necessarily
unaware of the exploitive behavior involved in youth trafficking, but they often
advance several arguments in favor of prosecution in order to "protect" child-
109. Thirty-nine states allow youth under the age of eighteen to be tried as juveniles.
See Mark Soler, Dana Shoenberg & Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a
New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 483, 496 (2010).
iio. In New York and North Carolina, children age sixteen and older are tried as
adults. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. 7B-1501(7) (2009).
in. For comparison purposes, Class B misdemeanors in New York include, among
others, offenses such as criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2009); loitering in the first degree, id. § 240.26;
criminal trespass in the third degree, id. § 140.10; possession of graffiti instru-
ments, id. § 145.65; and fortune telling, id. § 165-35. Given the minor nature of
some of these offenses, it is surprising that youth can serve a year in confinement
for an offense that falls within this category.
112. These will vary by state, but in New York, for example, disposition can include
anything from adjournment, where good behavior will result in dismissal, to
detention in a secured detention facility. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2. Options
in between these extremes include probation; an adjournment in contemplation
of dismissal, which generally grants an offender the ability to seal her case after a
year without further arrests; and a conditional discharge, which permits an of-
fender's case to be discharged after one year if she has no new arrests or bad beha-
vior, such as truancy, within that year. Id.
113. Solana Pyne, Activists Push To Get Bill Protecting Exploited Girls Passed, NYi (April
20, 2007) (quoting Kim McLaurin, Legal Aid Soc'y), http://www.nyi.com/
content/68952/activists-push-to-get-bill-protecting-exploited-girls-passed.
114. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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ren. First, many state law enforcement personnel view prosecution as the only
way to protect minors from their own behavior."' Opponents also express a be-
lief that an exploited youth "should be 'locked down' so that he or she can re-
ceive services and perhaps be persuaded to provide information against his or
her pimp.""' Some law enforcement personnel also argue that it is too difficult
to ensure that children will not run away and return to their abusers if law en-
forcement does not have the option of arresting and detaining them. They con-
clude that, as a result, prosecution is the only way to provide prostituted youth
with assistance."'7
Second, others argue that precluding prosecution would "decriminalize"
the prostitution of youth and make it more difficult to fight prostitution in
general."' Eliminating such prosecution, in this view, would create a "loophole"
for those who exploit minors for prostitution."9 A third argument in support of
prosecution is related to the testimony of prostituted youth. Because their
testimony is often necessary to successfully prosecute those who exploit them,
115. See, e.g., State's Response to Petition for Review at 7, In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818
(Tex. 2010) (No. 01-07-00274-cv) (arguing that prosecution is necessary because
exploited children are in need of protection); Thomas Adcock, Legal, Social
Services Community Prepare for Enactment of Safe Harbor Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3,
2008, at 23-24 (quoting John Feinblatt, New York City's criminal justice coordina-
tor, as saying that he opposed New York's Safe Harbor Act because he viewed
prosecution as necessary to be able to "get a child to stop destructive behavior").
n16. See Memorandum from the Sex & Law Comm., N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, to Assemb. Wil-
liam Scarborough and Sen. Dale Volker 6, available at http://www
.nycbar.org/pdf/report/SafeHarborMemo.pdf (quoting opponents of the Safe
Harbor Act). The State of Texas has argued that prosecuting children for prostitu-
tion is necessary to allow them to obtain "access to individual counseling" and the
"use of an educational specialist." State's Response to Petition for Review, supra
note 115, at 7. Texas also argued that children would go without assistance if they
were not prosecuted for engaging in sex acts for pay because "[i]n an age of dead-
ly sexually transmitted diseases, [the inability to prosecute] places young persons
who are highly vulnerable, and most needful of protection, outside the authority
of the juvenile justice system to aid them." Id. (citing In re C.S., 591 N.Y.S.2d 691
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992)).
117. See, e.g., State's Response to Petition for Review, supra note 115, at 6-8.
ni8. See id. at 7 (arguing that "it would be absurd to rule [that] juvenile girls and boys
may engage in prostitution immune from any criminal liability" because "pimps
would be encouraged to seek out juveniles to act as their prostitutes since there
would be no criminal liability for the prostitute herself"); Clyde Haberman,
Helping Girls as Victims, Not Culprits, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 20o8, at Bi (noting that
the Criminal Justice Coordinator in the New York City Mayor's Office opposed
New York legislation banning the prosecution of minors for prostitution, arguing
that "the best way to reach [girls] is not through decriminalization but rather
using the leverage of court-ordered services").
119. See, e.g., State's Response to Petition for Review, supra note 115, at 6-7.
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some argue that the mere threat of prosecution and the subsequent ability to
detain children is the most effective way to obtain their important testimony."2 o
Finally, some proponents of prosecution simply underestimate the reality of
coercion in this industry. They suggest that some of these children freely choose
to enter the life of a prostitute in order to profit financially.'"' This last argu-
ment has been made by those who oppose legislation that would amend laws
that penalize children for prostitution.' This belief still persists among many in
the law enforcement community. As one study observed, police officers as a
whole still do not "conceptualize all youth involved in prostitution as victims of
[commercial sexual exploitation]."'
These positions overlook two key points. First, even if legal reforms
precluded the prosecution of prostituted youth, other laws would continue to
prohibit individuals from purchasing sex with adults or children and would
continue to impose harsh consequences on individuals who exploit children by
coercing them into prostitution.' 4 Second, it is easier for law enforcement
personnel to build a relationship of trust with children when they are not at risk
of prosecution. Pimps and traffickers often condition young girls to fear
punishment by law enforcement so that they do not seek help.'"' But exploited
youth may be more likely to seek assistance from police if they are not at risk of
prosecution. This can ultimately benefit prosecutors who often need exploited
youth to cooperate with them in their prosecution of pimps and traffickers.
Reforms in this arena may also lead to better protection for exploited youth
since they may be more likely to seek needed medical attention from the public
health community if they do not fear retribution from authorities. When vic-
tims seek health care for the violence that they have endured or for sexual
health concerns, a vital point of intervention and opportunity to assist victims
is created.
120. See Editorial, Safe Harbor for Exploited Children, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2007, at A22.
121. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 45, at 26-27 (noting that some members of society
blame sexually exploited children for the situations in which they find them-
selves); Carrie Baker, Jailing Girls for Men's Crimes, Ms. MAG. BLOG (Dec. 8,
2010), http://www.msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/12/o8/jailing-girls-for-mens
-crimes/ (quoting an individual who opposed Georgia's proposed safe-harbor
law, which would have exempted minors from prosecution for prostitution).
122. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 121.
123. Halter, supra note 6, at 158; see also Finkelhor & Ormrod, supra note 17, at 1.
124. As of 2011, forty-three states have passed anti-trafficking laws, most of
which impose more stringent fines when the victim is a minor. See CTR. FOR
WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, FACT SHEET ON STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING
LAWS 3 (2011), available at http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/documents/
FactSheetonStateAntiTraffickingLawsFebruary2ou.pdf; see also Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2oo6) (criminalizing
attempts to engage in sex trafficking and increasing penalties for sex trafficking).
125. See supra note 77.
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On the whole, opponents of reform argue that exempting minors from
prosecution will undermine the State's ability to protect children and misgui-
dedly encourage the sexual exploitation of minors."' With regard to the protec-
tion aspect of those arguments, laws already exist or can be amended to permit
a child welfare agency to provide medical and therapeutic services to survivors
of commercial sexual exploitation."' Lawmakers could also pass legislation that
requires law enforcement and other personnel to report to public agencies
when they encounter the suspected sexual abuse of a child by any person, not
just by a parent or caretaker.2' This scheme is already in place in some states
and can be created in others. With multidisciplinary expertise and expanded
specialized services, these services could provide effective protection: One study
reported that 87% of exploited youth in the study had a desire to exit prostitu-
tion if given the opportunity, and many mentioned that support systems would
be critical in helping them do so."' In addition, victim-centered approaches
have promising potential at the federal level.
Ultimately, there is little support for the argument that children should be
detained so that they can receive services and protection from themselves.
While it is true that some minors run away and return to a pimp if they are not
locked up,'30 this does not justify lawmakers' willingness to ignore rational
consent arguments against prosecution. It also does not merit overlooking the
effects of successful victim-centered approaches over time. 3' Further, while
supporters advocate prosecution in the name of "protection" and "providing
services," the juvenile justice system has demonstrated that it is not an effective
126. See, e.g., In re B.W., 313 S.W. 3d 818, 824 (Tex. 2010); Haberman, supra note 30, at
BI; Kyle Wingfield, Child Prostitution, Sex Trafficking Back on Legislative
Agenda, ATLANTA J.-CONST. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011, 7:03 PM), http://blogs
.ajc.com/kyle-wingfield/20n/02/09/child-prostitution-sex-trafficking-back-on
-legislative-agenda! (describing opposition to a Georgia safe harbor bill by various
groups).
127. See, e.g., Illinois Safe Children Act, 2010 Ill. Laws 6931 (amending the Abused and
Neglected Child Reporting Act, 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-19.3 (2010)); see also
Halter, supra note 6, at 158 (arguing that "policy makers need to sort out [the]
roles and responsibilities of the police and Child Protection Services for youth
involved in prostitution to create pathways for resistant youth to receive the
necessary treatment and services").
128. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2009) (amending the mandatory reporting sta-
tute to require reports notifying Georgia's Department of Human Services when a
person has "reasonable cause to believe that a child is being sexually exploited by
any person").
129. See also CURTIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 102, io6-o8.
130. See Brown, supra note 103, at 473.
131. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
29
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
purveyor of those services and, in fact, can increase harm to children.132 In addi-
tion to exacerbating the current incoherence of the law, these failures to assist
children provide powerful arguments in support of reform. There is over-
whelming evidence that confinement does not succeed in assisting juveniles-
particularly the vulnerable population of sexually abused girls-since it does
not attend to their gender-specific problems.' In particular, girls' detention
centers sorely lack programming relevant to the experiences of sexually ex-
ploited youth.134 In addition, sexual misconduct and harmful behavior by staff
members in these facilities is well documented.135 Often, girls are released from
detention with few referrals for services that will help them build a healthy
life.*
2. The Conflict with Statutory Rape Laws
Lawmakers' application of prostitution statutes to juveniles raises the
practical question of whether a juvenile can be guilty of prostitution if he or she
132. See, e.g., GIRLS' JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the ways in
which poor conditions in detention centers often exacerbate the difficulties facing
youth who have suffered sexual and other trauma). "With rare exceptions, the
overall quality of services for girls in placement is poor." Id.; see also Tracy,
Kempf-Leonard & Abramoske-James, supra note 82, at 18o (noting that "[e]ven
among those criminal justice agencies that do try to respond to females, there are
many inappropriate services, interventions, and sanctions").
133. See SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 24-28.
134. See id. Additionally, Soler, Schoenberg, and Schindler note that, despite high rates
of prior sexual abuse among girls in detention facilities, there are few evaluations
that determine which programs help girls most. Soler, Schoenberg & Schindler,
supra note 109, at 502 (citing Barbara Bloom et al., Improving Juvenile Justice for
Females: A Statewide Assessment in California, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 526 (2002)).
135. See Soler, Schoenberg & Schindler, supra note lo9, at 506 (noting that there is
"growing documentation of sexual victimization of youth in custody across the
country. . ."); see also Lustig, supra note 57, at 40 (quoting one girl who stated, "I
had a male staff tell me, 'I can give it to you better than any young boy"');
HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMOND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
2006 NATIONAL REPORT 231 (20o6). While girls represented 11% of the overall
youth population in detention facilities, girls accounted for 34% of the victims of
substantiated incidents of sexual violence in state facilities. Id. The most recent
juvenile detention facility investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice found
flagrant examples of sexual abuse by staff members and concluded that that the
"sexualized environment at the facility appears rampant." CIVIL RIGHTS Div.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE INDIANAPOLIS JUVENILE CORREC-
TIONAL FACILITY 10 (2010). Aside from abuse, the investigation revealed numer-
ous reports filed by detainees regarding inappropriate sexual advances and com-
ments made by staff. Id. at 9-11.
136. GIRLS' JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 7.
30
30:1 2011
CONSENT, COERCION, AND COMPASSION
cannot legally consent to sex and when that same act of "prostitution" includes
his or her exploitation, by definition. All states and the federal government have
laws that prohibit sex between an adult and a minor.3 7 For purposes of this
discussion, "statutory rape" laws refer to laws that define the age below which a
person is legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity with an adult."'
States vary in their implementation and definition of this principle, including
the age and conditions under which the law will consider the presence of con-
sent. The purpose of statutory rape laws in modern terms is to protect minors
from sexual exploitation and "those who would prey on their vulnerability."'3 9
Indeed, numerous studies and interdisciplinary scholarship note that adoles-
cent development leaves youth vulnerable to coercive or abusive sexual con-
duct. 40 Because statutory rape laws preclude legal consent to sexual activity,
these laws implicitly attribute coercion or abuse to an adult who has sex with a
minor. Indeed, statutory rape cases presume coercion, as does the TVPA with
regard to people under eighteen when it defines who is a severe victim of traf-
ficking.141 Conversely, because adults can legally consent to sex with one anoth-
er, adult victims of commercial sexual exploitation bear the legal burden of
proving that they were subject to coercion or force to demonstrate that they are
trafficking victims.142
The source of this tension-the principle that an underage child cannot
legally consent to sex-originates in the common law.'43 The age of consent is
137. ASAPH GLOSSER, KAREN GARDINER & MIKE FISHMAN, LEWIN GROUP, STATUTORY
RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 3 (2oo4), availa-
ble at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/o8/SR/StateLaws/report.pdf. Under federal law, the
prohibition of sex with a minor appears at 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (20o6).
138. Only a few states have laws in force that define an offense actually titled "statutory
rape"; instead, most states have statutes dictating "age-specific provisions address-
ing voluntary sexual acts and the age at which an individual can legally consent to
such acts." GLOSSER, GARDINER & FISHMAN, supra note 137, at 3.
139. Oberman, supra note 73, at 754 (noting, however, that at their inception, the laws
were concerned with "a father's interest in his daughter's chastity").
140. See id. at 704-05 (citing a myriad of studies dealing with the impacts of and issues
raised by adolescent sexuality and abuses).
141. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8). The TVPA defines "severe forms of trafficking in persons" as
"sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coer-
cion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained
eighteen years of age." Id.
142. Id. (including persons under eighteen within the definition regardless of evidence
of force, fraud, or coercion).
143. See, e.g., State v. Hazelton, 915 A.2d 224, 233-34 (Vt. 20o6) ("The rule that an un-
derage child cannot consent to sex need not derive from statute . . . but is a part of
common law."). While the age of consent was placed at age ten at common law,
every state has raised this age by statute. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d
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sixteen under federal law'" and in thirty-three states, the District of Columbia,
and the Model Penal Code; six states elect age seventeen as their age of consent;
and in the remaining eleven states, the age of consent is age eighteen.145 Though
the specific age varies by state, all of them have laws dictating that minors under
a certain age cannot legally consent to sex.41
Only twelve states have laws that define a uniform age of consent to sex.'47
Most states apply a two-tiered approach when addressing adult sex with a
minor.4s The laws in those states distinguish between sex with a younger child
and sex with an older teen. They often establish a provision for circumstances
known as "factual consent" that may negate the prosecution of the alleged
offender for statutory rape where there is less of an age difference between the
two people in the relationship at issue.1'4 Therefore, while it is a crime to have
sex with a child under seventeen in most states, many create a factual consent
867, 875 (Ky. 1981); see also GLOSSER, GARDINER & FISHMAN, supra note 137, at 6
(providing a table listing the age of consent for all fifty states as of 20o6).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(1) (2oo6).
145. See GLOSSER, GARDINER & FISHMAN, supra note 137, at 6-7. Under the Model Pen-
al Code, statutory rape occurs when a person has sexual intercourse with another
person who is "less than sixteen years old and the actor is at least four years older
than the other person." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213-3(1)(a) (2001). Black's Law
Dictionary uses a similar definition, stating that statutory rape is "[u] nlawful sex-
ual intercourse with a person under the age of consent (as defined by statute),
regardless of whether it is against that person's will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1374 (9th ed. 2009). It defines "age of consent" as "[t]he age, usually defined by
statute as 16 years, at which a person is legally capable of agreeing to marriage
(without parental consent) or to sexual intercourse." Id. at 70.
146. For a description of this principle and its relationship with cases prosecuting
those who traffic youth, see United States v. Ebert, 561 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2009)
("Because the victims [in this commercial sexual exploitation case] were minors
and could not legally consent [to sex], the government did not need to prove the
elements of fraud, force, or coercion, which are required for adult victims."). See
also United States v. Abad, 350 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
children cannot consent to sexual contact and stating that "[w] hen sexual assaults
are committed upon children . . . consent is not a defense" (quoting Guarro v.
United States, 237 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
147. See GLOSSER, GARDINER & FISHMAN, supra note 137, at 6-7 (providing a table that
identifies those twelve states and their respective ages of consent: age eighteen in
California and Wisconsin; age seventeen in Illinois and New York; and age sixteen
in Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Neva-
da, and Vermont).
148. See id. (noting that thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia include differ-
ing ages of legal consent rather than choosing only one valid age of consent for
purposes of prosecuting the other participant in the sexual act).
149. See infra note 150.
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exception if the child is above a certain age, usually thirteen or fourteen. These
provisions are generally limited to situations in which the accused is no more
than three or four years older than the victim, and there are no allegations of
force.5 o
The existence of statutory rape laws creates complicated questions when
courts and legislatures consider them in parallel with the prosecution of prosti-
tuted youth. When state law explicitly precludes legal consent by a child to sex
with an adult or otherwise, how can that child still be eligible for prosecution
for the same act? Furthermore, if two-tiered statutory rape provisions include
some forms of factual consent for older teens, to what extent does that negate
the argument that older teens cannot consent to prostitution because of implied
coercion? Courts now face these and other questions. When the first question
was raised in New York by a victim of commercial sexual exploitation, Nicolette
R., the court held that a child's inability to consent to sexual acts did not prohi-
bit the state from using prostitution statutes to prosecute her for those acts."'
B. State Court Challenges to the Prosecution of Minors for Prostitution
Until recently, New York was the only state whose appellate court had con-
sidered a challenge to the prosecution eligibility of minors for prostitution.
While New York rejected the argument against prosecution,515 in 2olo, the Tex-
as Supreme Court took on the issue and reached the opposite conclusion. It
held that a youth's inability to consent to sexual acts does prohibit the state
from prosecuting children under age fourteen for prostitution,153 in direct con-
trast to the New York ruling.
The Texas Supreme Court took a major step forward toward reconciling
existing laws. The decision was the first of its kind to challenge current legal
contradictions, holding that "[bjecause a thirteen-year-old child cannot con-
sent to sex as a matter of law .. . [the minor] cannot be prosecuted as a prosti-
tute."14 This created a split between the two states where state appellate and
supreme courts have ruled on the issue.
150. See GLOSSER, GARDINER & FISHMAN, supra note 137, at 6-7. For example, in Penn-
sylvania, children under thirteen cannot consent to sex under any circumstances,
and, therefore, sexual relations with a thirteen-year-old are always considered sta-
tutory rape. 18 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West 2011). However, a person be-
tween the ages of thirteen and sixteen in Pennsylvania can "factually consent" to
sex if the two parties are less than four years apart. See id. § 3125. Factual consent
is a term used commonly by courts in discussions related to these provisions of
statutory rape law. See, e.g., U.S. v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (2008).
151. In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D. 3d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
152. Id.
153. In re B.W., 313 S.W. 3 d 818, 821 (Tex. 2010).
154. Id.
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1. The Rejection of the Consent Argument in New York
The question of a minor's consent in a prostitution case reached New
York's intermediate court of appeals in 2004."' There, a minor challenged the
rationale of prosecuting children for prostitution if they are under the age of
consent."' The court rejected the minor's argument.'57 Nicolette R., the appel-
lant, was a twelve-year-old girl who had offered to perform oral sex on an
undercover police officer for forty dollars."' The court held that although her
age made her incapable of consenting to any sexual act-including those ren-
dered unlawful by the penal code-this was "irrelevant to the issue of whether
she was properly found to have committed an act ... which would constitute
the crime of prostitution."' 9 It reasoned that the relevant statute defining pros-
titution contains no age requirement, and, thus, minors could be subject to
prosecution under it.'"o The court found that while underage status constitutes
a lack of consent under the penal law sections dealing with statutory rape, those
statutes did not bear any relationship to prostitution involving a minor.'' Nico-
lette R. argued that the statutory rape laws declaring her incapable of consent,
along with community interests in protecting children, dictated dismissal of the
case."6 2 Because the court ultimately failed to reconcile the incongruity between
statutory rape laws and the prosecution of young people for prostitution,
reform advocates in New York focused on legislative efforts to amend the law.63
Nicolette R.'s life experience mirrors many of the signature characteristics
of children involved in sexual exploitation, which is relevant to those consider-
ing legislative and court solutions to best address the problem. As a young
child, Nicolette R. suffered sexual abuse and abandonment by her parents.16 4
155. In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D. 3d at 270.
156. Id. at 271.
157. Id.
158. Thomas Adcock, Nicolette's Story, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 20o8, at 23-24.
159. In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d at 271.
160. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 2009)).
161. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL § 130.05(3)(a)).
162. See Adcock, supra note 158, at 23 (quoting the appellant's brief, which was written
by Katherine Mullen, the child's attorney, who later was central in the passage of
New York's Safe Harbor Act). While the court rejected Nicolette R.'s argument, it
found that the lower court failed to consider the best placement for her and noted
that the facility where she was placed by the court was not adequate to provide her
with the specialized services that she needed. In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d at 271.
This finding is illustrative of the disjunction between detention and the actual
delivery of services to these children through judicial remedies.
163. See Adcock, supra note 158; see also infra Section III.A.
164. Adcock, supra note 158, at 23.
34
30: 1 2011
CONSENT, COERCION, AND COMPASSION
After running away from her aunt's residence, where she was also abused, she
came "under the control of an adult male pimp" and was forced into prostitu-
tion.6 5 Psychologist reports noted that she bore scars, burns, and other recent
wounds,' 6 indicating that she endured violence during the time she was
exploited.
The court's decision illustrates the common legal paradigm for prosecuting
children for prostitution in state courts. While federal trafficking laws were in
place before the In re Nicolette R. decision, they were only amended more
recently to better address the needs of domestic-born children.'67 In addition,
before In re Nicolette R., most states had not yet passed related anti-trafficking
reforms that focused on curbing commercial sexual exploitation and enhancing
penalties for trafficking minors as they have in subsequent years.' 8 The impact
of this cultural shift was demonstrated by the Texas Supreme Court's opinion
when it embraced the same argument that the New York court had rejected.
2. The Texas Supreme Court's Decision that Consent Matters
Six years after the New York court issued its decision in In re Nicolette R.,
the Texas Supreme Court faced the same legal question in In re B.W. It held
that a child could not be charged with prostitution because children under the
age of fourteen cannot legally consent to sex."' The court reasoned that when
children lack the capacity to consent to sex as a matter of law, it is incongruous
to charge them with prostitution.'7 0 The facts of In re B. W. were quite similar to
those that were before the New York court in In re Nicolette R. B.W., age thir-
teen, offered to engage in oral sex with an undercover police officer in exchange
for twenty dollars. She was arrested and charged with prostitution. 7' At trial,
B.W. pled that she "knowingly agree[d] to engage in sexual conduct... for a
fee." 72 A court report described B.W.'s history of sexual and physical abuse,
stating that she was "emotionally impoverished, discouraged and dependent."' 73
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See infra Section II.C.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 193-194 (explaining that, in 2004, only four
states had anti-trafficking legislation as compared to forty-three states by 2010).
169. In re B.W., 313 S.W-3d 818 (Tex. 2010).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 819. B.W. was initially charged in criminal court; however, when it was
revealed that she was a juvenile, the charges were refiled in family court. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The psychologist's report noted that B.W. was "preoccupied with
self-doubt... [and] yearns for acceptance and affection." Amicus Curiae Brief of
Children at Risk in Support of Petitioner's Petitiofi for Review, In re B.W., 313
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B.W. had also run away from foster care the prior year.174 The court adjudicated
her a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for eighteen months.'7
On appeal, B.W. argued that children under fourteen could not be prose-
cuted for engaging in prostitution because "the legislature cannot have
intended to apply the offense of prostitution to children under fourteen because
children below that age cannot legally consent to sex."176 In Texas, sex with a
minor under the age of fourteen is criminalized under any circumstance, with
different treatment for older minors depending on the age of the other party.177
The court recognized this distinct section of the state's statutory rape law and
held that " [w] hile no statute explicitly states that children under fourteen are
unable to provide consent for all purposes, the inability of children to consent
to sex as a matter of law is both part of the common law and a necessary infe-
rence from [the relevant provision of the Texas Penal Code addressing statutory
rape] and other statutes dealing with sexual exploitation of a child.*171
The court agreed with the appellant's argument about the intent of the leg-
islature.7 9 The court reasoned that the state's statutory rape and trafficking laws
were designed to protect children from exploitation and concluded that prosti-
tution laws could not be applied to children under fourteen because prostitu-
tion of youth involves exploitation.' It also found that laws recently enacted in
Texas to address sexual trafficking and child exploitation supported its analysis
of the legislative intent in the penal code.'' In doing so, the court found that
related statutes provided examples of the legislature's belief in "the extreme im-
portance of protecting children from sexual exploitation, and the awareness
that children are more vulnerable to exploitation by others even in the absence
of explicit threats or fraud.""'
S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2010) (No. 01-07-OO274-cv), 2010 WL 43oo61 (internal citation
omitted).
174. See State's Response to Petition for Review at 1, In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818 (Tex.
2010) (No. 01-07-00274-cv).
175. In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d at 819. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion. B.W. sought relief from the Texas Supreme Court.
176. Id.
177. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011).
178. In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W. 3d 486,
493 (Tex. 2001)) (noting that the court could "consider the common law and laws
on the same or similar subjects in determining legislative intent").
179. Id. at 821.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The court noted that under the Penal Code, a person who compels by any
means a child under eighteen to commit prostitution has committed "a crime
[that is] equivalent to tsing 'force, threat, or fraud' to compel an adult to commit
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In a key passage, the court summarized its analysis of the legislature's intent
and highlighted the significance of the Texas statutes' protecting children from
sexual exploitation:
It is difficult to reconcile the Legislature's recognition of the special
vulnerability of children, and its passage of laws for their protection,
with an intent to find that children under fourteen understand the
nature and consequences of their conduct when they agree to commit a
sex act for money, or to consider children quasi-criminal offenders
guilty of an act that necessarily involves their own sexual
exploitation.'
In its discussion about the nature of consent, the court acknowledged the
rationale behind statutory rape laws. Namely, such statutes preclude younger
children from legally consenting to sex because they "lack the capacity to appre-
ciate the significance or the consequences of agreeing to sex."184 The court cited
the Roper and Graham v. Florida"' Supreme Court decisions to support this
notion, acknowledging the differences between adolescent and adult minds and
how this developmental distinction bears on issues of culpability."'
In re B. W. represents significant progress toward realizing a coherent legal
framework for prostituted youth. However, it is not without limitations.
Currently, children over age thirteen remain eligible for prosecution for prosti-
tution in Texas based on the court's analysis of the state's two-tier statutory
rape law. Just one year prior to the In re B.W. decision, an appellate court in
Texas upheld the prosecution of a sixteen-year-old for prostitution!" The In re
B. W. decision would not dictate the outcome of that case if it were tried today.
However, In re B. W. provides persuasive reasoning against prosecuting all mi-
prostitution." Id. In addition, that person is charged with a second-degree felony
for compelling a minor to commit prostitution, as opposed to a misdemeanor for
a perpetrator who compels an adult. Id. (citing TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.03,
.05 (West 2011)). The court cited other relevant statutes, finding it significant that
the "sexual assault of a child under fourteen is considered 'aggravated sexual
assault' and is subject to the same consequences as the rape of an adult involving
serious bodily injury or other aggravating circumstances." Id. (citing PENAL
§§ 22.011, .021). The court also noted the imposition of harsher penalties under
PENAL § 43-25(e) for inducing a child under age fourteen to engage in sexual con-
duct or performance, and the imposition of harsher penalties under PENAL
§ 20A.02 for trafficking a child under age eighteen for purposes of compelling
prostitution or sexual performance. Id. at 821.
183. Id. at 821.
184. Id. at 820.
185. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
186. Id. at 823 (citing the Supreme Court's discussion of the reduced mental capacity
of minors as compared to adults in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005),
and Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)).
187. In re B.D.S.D., 289 S.W-3 d 889 (Tex. App. 2009).
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nors based upon its reference to the purpose of the state's other laws addressing
the exploitation of children'" and its framing of Supreme Court language.
The contrast between the New York and Texas cases potentially signals a
new era in the law's treatment of the commercial sexual exploitation of youth.
The differing outcomes highlight the developments in sex trafficking laws dur-
ing the years between the decisions, the evolving status of domestic prostituted
youth, and the role of scientific information about adolescent development in
the courts. Both of the U.S. Supreme Court cases that rely on emerging science
about adolescent development were decided after In re Nicolette R., and cited in
In re B. W. Those decisions provided the Texas Supreme Court with significant
additional support for its reasoning that was unavailable to the New York
appellate court. 9 Indeed, In re B. W. was the first court decision to cite Graham
outside of the sentencing context at issue in that case, signaling its instructive
precedent for courts considering questions of adolescent behavior.
The Texas court also acknowledged that the state legislature's passage of a
strict anti-trafficking law significantly influenced its decision.'9 o Texas was
notably one of the first states to enact a statute that criminalized trafficking.'91
In contrast, New York had not yet passed any anti-trafficking laws when its
appellate court considered the In re Nicolette R. case in 2004. The New York leg-
islature subsequently passed strict anti-trafficking laws three years later in
2007.192 In fact, in 2004, only four states had specific anti-trafficking legislation
that allowed for the prosecution of domestic sex traffickers. 93 By 2010,
forty-three states and the District of Columbia had passed anti-trafficking legis-
lation; many states had increased penalties for exploitation of minors, as Texas
did; and some had authorized victim restitution and services.194
Finally, although the federal TVPA was passed in 2001, it had not yet prov-
en to be a strong tool for protecting domestic minors when New York decided
In re Nicolette in 2004. It was not until 2005 that Congress passed legislation, as
188. In re B. W., 313 S.W-3d at 821.
189. Id. at 823.
190. Id. at 821.
191. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 641, sec. 2, § 20A.02, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2045 (codified
as amended at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2oA.02 (West 2011)). Washington passed
a similar law in 2003. Act of May 14, 2003, ch. 267, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 1436
(codified in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE).
192. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34 (McKinney 2oog) (creating the crime of "sex traf-
ficking" as a Class B felony); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 483-cc(b) (McKinney 2007)
(incorporating the federal definition of "severe trafficking victim" to assess
trafficking victims, and setting forth protocols for police encounters with minor
victims).
193. These states were Florida, Missouri, Texas, and Washington. See CTR. FOR WOM-
EN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 124.
194. Id.
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part of an effort that amended the TVPA, recognizing domestically trafficked
minors and specifically directing funding to their needs. 95
C. Federal Trafficking Laws Treating Juveniles as Victims
Federal sex trafficking laws initially focused solely on addressing interna-
tional trafficking issues.196 Only recently has the TVPA responded to the need to
protect domestic youth. This evolution influenced the initiation of change at
the state level. For example, definitions and concepts formed by the TVPA were
incorporated into state law'97 and supported ideology that drove efforts to elim-
inate prosecution as a mechanism against children who were arrested for pros-
titution.
i. The Evolution and Influence of the TVPA
The need to protect foreign-born noncitizens was more readily recognized
by the public and federal law enforcement officials than the plight of domestic
youth, when the TVPA was enacted in 2000.9' There was appropriately broad
support for legislation to improve the plight of foreign-born women and child-
ren, as this was considered a nonpartisan issue.'99 Since trafficked foreigners of-
ten lack documentation that will enable them to remain in the United States,
they are particularly vulnerable, and their abusers exploit their fear of deporta-
tion and limited access to outside assistance.2 oo The TVPA thus sought to aid
these victims by providing them with special immigration status and victim
195. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-164, sec. 2o3(f)-(g), 119 Stat. 3558, 3570 (20o6) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 14044b(f)-(g) (20o6)).
196. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7 101(b)(24) (2006);
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164,
sec. 2(3), 119 Stat. 3558, 3558-59 (2006) (acknowledging in its legislative findings
that international victims had been the primary focus of federal efforts).
197. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
198. The TVPA noted that 700,000 persons are trafficked within or across internation-
al borders annually, including 50,000 women and children trafficked into the
United States. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1) (20o6); cf Jennifer M. Chac6n, Misery
and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts To Stop Human Trafficking,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2991 (2006) (noting that the issue has been cast mostly
as a foreign problem).
199. See Lindsay Strauss, Note, Adult Domestic Trafficking and the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
495, 500 (2010) (noting that supporters included religious groups, feminists, and
nonprofit organizations); see also Chac6n, supra note 198, at 2991.
2oo. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(5), (19)-(20) (2oo6).
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assistance.2 0 ' Even with this focused approach, however, the law's initial effec-
tiveness in assisting international sex trafficking victims in the United States
was limited.2"'
Years later, as commercially exploited domestic minors gained societal
attention, advocates recognized the TVPA as an instrument that could poten-
tially address the needs of domestic youth in addition to foreign-born youth.20 3
Previously viewed as blameworthy street youth "prostituting" themselves,
advocates and policy makers gradually included domestic youth in the federal
legislative discourse about sex trafficking in the United States.2 0 4 From its incep-
tion, the language of the TVPA recognized that all children under age eighteen
who are induced into sex trafficking are severely trafficked persons.0 , There-
fore, technically, the language of the TVPA did not foreclose offering civil pro-
tection and services to domestic minors, despite the fact that legislators initially
focused efforts on foreign-born victims. By definition, the TVPA ensures that
child victims do not have to prove "coercion, duress, or fraud" to be considered
"severely trafficked persons" for purposes of protection under the TVPA.oe
Advocates viewed the TVPA as a key potential tool to leverage protection for
prostituted domestic youth because they meet the definition of being "severely
201. See id. § 7105(b)(i)(A), (C) & (E) (granting a T-visa when victims cooperated with
law enforcement as witnesses against traffickers).
202. See Chac6n, supra note 198, at 2991 (noting that "[w]hile there has been much dis-
cussion of trafficking, the issue has been cast as a foreign problem with unfortu-
nate domestic manifestations"); Charles Song & Suzy Lee, Between a Sharp Rock
and a Very Hard Place: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the Unintended
Consequences of the Law Enforcement Cooperation Requirement, i INTERCULTURAL
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 133, 136-37 (2oo6); April Rieger, Note, Missing the Mark: Why
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails To Protect Sex Trafficking Victims in the
United States, 3o HARv. J.L. & GENDER 231, 233 (2007).
203. See, e.g., Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 70, at 14
(statement of Rachel Lloyd, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Girls Educ. & Mentoring
Servs.); ALBANESE, supra note ii, at 8-9.
204. See, e.g., ALBANESE, supra note n1, at 8-9 (noting the need to recognize as victims
of exploitation prostituted young people, the common perception by the public
that they are "teenage prostitutes" rather than victims, and the need to include
them in the larger policy discourse). The U.S. government has held hearings with
detailed testimony and attention to domestic youth that acknowledge the prosti-
tution of youth as a form of trafficking. These hearings include the Domestic
Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, the Child Prostitution and Sex Traf-
ficking Hearing, supra note 70, and the Exploiting Americans on American Soil
Hearing, supra note 49.
205. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (20o6). The TVPA defines "severe forms of trafficking in
persons" as "sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not
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trafficked."o 7 In addition, the TVPA grants victims access to protective services,
including medical care and safe housing.20s Therefore, the argument that child-
ren like Elana, Nicolette R., and B.W. are victims becomes more compelling
when one considers that they are "severely trafficked persons" under the TVPA.
This is arguably in direct contrast with the idea of prosecuting such children.
Rachel Lloyd, founder of one of the few residential programs in the United
States that specializes in working with sexually exploited youth, has advocated
against the prosecution of the young female victims with whom she works.o'
Arguing for uniform change at the state level that would be consistent with the
TVPA's view of trafficked minors as victims, Lloyd noted the contradiction and
flaws in current practices, wherein "Katya from the Ukraine will be seen as a
real victim and provided with services and support, but Keisha from the Bronx
will be seen as a 'willing participant', someone who is out there because she
'likes it' and who is criminalized and thrown in detention or jail." 210
This statement captures the contradiction in state and federal law and prac-
tice. In addition, this common stereotype appears to be consistent with resis-
tance to changing the practices of prosecuting domestic youth."' While the
TVPA and its enforcement did not initially focus on assisting domestic youth,
amendments to the law and concurrent steps by the federal government have
slowly influenced states in a positive direction.m
Specifically, Congress recognized the plight of domestic youth subject to
sexual exploitation when it reauthorized the TVPA in 2005. Congress
207. Id.
208. The TVPA establishes that "to the extent practicable ... [v]ictims of severe forms
of trafficking" shall "(A) not be detained in facilities inappropriate to their status
as crime victims; (B) receive necessary medical care and other assistance; and (C)
be provided protection if [their] safety is at risk or if there is danger of additional
harm by recapture" by traffickers. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(1) (2006).
209. See Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 70, at 14 (statement
of Rachel Lloyd, Exec. Dir. & Founder, Girls Educ. & Mentoring Servs.).
210. Id.
211. For example, societal blame placed on these children and the accompanying rea-
soning is discussed by Hanna, supra note 45, at 26-27.
212. See infra Section III.A (discussing the reference to the TVPA by a New York State
statute offering protection to minors arrested for prostitution).
213. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164,
secS. 2(3)-(4), 203, 119 Stat. 3558, 3558-59 (20o6). This was preceded by an FBI
program called "The Innocence Lost Initiative," which was dedicated to the needs
of domestic minors who had been prostituted. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES To COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 22-23 (20o8), available at http://www.justice.gov/
archive/ag/annualreports/tr2007/agreporthumantrafficing2007.pdf.
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included new provisions that acknowledged the need to help trafficked children
born in the United States. 14 Of note, in 20o6, the reauthorized TVPA set up a
pilot program to establish residential rehabilitative services for juvenile victims
encountered by state law enforcement.' In addition, Congress expressly noted
that runaway and homeless children in the United States are vulnerable to
exploitation. 16 Furthermore, the reauthorized TVPA made direct mention of
funding appropriations for programs aimed at domestic victims, which demon-
strated the federal government's official recognition of domestic-born victims'
need for protection and services, just like foreign-born sex trafficking victims.
The U.S. Department of Justice also provided additional training for federal
and local law enforcement and social services providers. 17 It did so because
these law enforcement officials and social providers are typically unaware of the
relationship between youth prostitution cases and emerging developments
about how to treat the youth involved in those cases as victims of commercial
sexual exploitation, rather than as criminals."' At the same time, there has been
little practical reform for domestic-born victims of sexual exploitation who are
prosecuted in juvenile courts. 9
2. The Status of Minors Under State and Federal Law
Reform advocates now argue that identifying victims and gaining their
trust can be the most difficult but also the most important steps toward com-
bating commercial sexual exploitation.22 0 Criminalizing and arresting young
victims can make them more hostile and less willing to testify against their
214. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, sec. 203(a)-(b), (d),
(f) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14044b(a)-(b), (d), (f) (2006)) (establish-
ing a pilot program for residential treatment facilities for juvenile victims and in-
cluding youth born in the United States in the definition of "juvenile subjected to
trafficking").
215. Id.
216. Id. sec. 2(6) ("Runaway and homeless children in the United States are highly sus-
ceptible to being domestically trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.").
217. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., supra note 213, at 32-33.
218. See OFFICE To MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 21 (2006), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/66o86.pdf (stating that "law enforcement
must ... train personnel to identify and direct trafficking victims to appropriate
care").
219. See supra Section II.A.
220. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 132 (statement of
Francey Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, &
Interdiction, Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.); CLAWSON & DUTCH, supra
note 25, at 2.
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pimps."' Advocates of a more "victim-centered law enforcement" approach
note that not only is it "a matter of decency" to recognize prostituted children
as victims instead of perpetrators, but it is also a more effective way to obtain
their cooperation with law enforcement personnel.' Thus, a victim-centered
approach provides aid to law enforcement and, at the same time, is consistent
with the position espoused by the FBI that "children can never consent to pros-
titution. It is always exploitation."2 2
Experts in this area of federal law enforcement recognize that gaps in
services often result in detention for children instead of access to meaningful
assistance.2 4 Federal officials report that proper treatment of minors such as
access to secure housing and services is necessary to allow them to build a rap-
port with victims for assistance in prosecutions.2 5 Recognizing the importance
of assistance, federal law mandates that treatment and appropriate medical at-
tention be provided to victims of severe trafficking with the goal of gaining their
trust and cooperation."' This statutory and cultural shift at the federal level-
away from state law enforcement emphases on criminalizing exploited youth-
is a positive step. However, federal law enforcement officials must work in tan-
dem with state officials to investigate prostitution rings and instances of sexual
221. See, e.g., Urbina, supra note 2, at Ai. Similar to the federal approach that views
children as victims rather than criminals, the article discusses how police in Dal-
las, Texas, reach out to youth instead of arresting them because "[i] f the girls are
arrested for prostitution, they are at their least cooperative." Id.; cf SMITH,
VARDAMAN & SNOW, supra note 71, at 61.
222. See Trafficking in Persons: The Federal Government's Approach To Eradicate this
Worldwide Problem: Hearing on H.R. 972 Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights &
Wellness of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, lo8th Cong. 46 (2004) [hereinafter
2004 House Hearing] (statement of R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
223. See Exploiting Americans on American Soil Hearing, supra note 49, at 6 (statement
of Chris Swecker, Assistant Dir., Criminal Investigative Div., Fed. Bureau of In-
vestigation) (discussing the position of federal law and international agreements
on domestic sex trafficking of minors).
224. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 128 (statement of Francey
Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdiction,
Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.); SMITH, VARDAMAN & SNow, supra note 71,
at vi.
225. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 132 (statement of Francey
Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdiction,
Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.).
226. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(1)(A) (20o6)
(providing that victims should not be detained in facilities that are "inappropriate
to their status as crime victims").
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exploitation of minors and to find ways to safely house victims. 2 7 This need can
be fulfilled most successfully if reforms occur at the state level to allow law en-
forcement approaches to be in sync with one another. There continues to be
room for improvement at the federal level, as well. Even with the more sophis-
ticated reforms led by the federal government, girls who are not prosecuted
may instead be held and detained for extended periods of time as material wit-
nesses.228 This practice, while superior to prosecuting exploited youth, is not a
model alternative as this area of the law develops. The legality of these extended
detentions and the scope of the Material Witness Statute is, in fact, questionable
and likely to be challenged, given language in a recent concurring opinion writ-
ten by Justice Kennedy and joined in part by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor.2 2 9
Due to this growing awareness that children born both in and outside of
the United States are trafficking victims in need of support,2 3 o state legislators
have begun to take action. To this end, a handful of states have adopted the
concept born in federal law that force, coercion, or fraud need not be demon-
strated for a minor to be considered a victim and for the law to recognize her
lack of consent to prostitution."' Though most states continue to prosecute
commercially sexually exploited youth, there are signs of progress that the
status quo is changing in some state legislatures. For example, recent legislation
modeled after federal law creates safe harbors for children who would otherwise
be eligible for prosecution.
227. See Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 126 (statement of
Francey Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, &
Interdiction, Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.) (describing a program to fund
local services in cities to assist domestic minors).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Brice, 649 F.3d 793 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that six or
seven girls were held as material witnesses in a trial against a defendant for child
sex trafficking and transporting a minor for prostitution, among other offenses);
see also Brown, supra note 103, at 488 (discussing the coercive use of material
witness warrants, the unresolved law surrounding their use, and the detention of
prostituted women and children under material witness warrants).
229. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2o86 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing with pointed concern the undetermined scope of the Material Witness
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2oo6)). Justice Ginsburg's concurrence stated the
importance of "vigilant exercise" of the discretionary role of a judge or magistrate
determining its proper issuance and duration. Id. at 2088 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring).
230. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101,
7102(3), 7105, 71o9a (20o6). See generally SMITH, VARDAMAN & SNow, supra note
71 (recognizing the need to help domestic youth and include them in the traffick-
ing reform movement).
231. See infra Part III (describing emerging state legal responses that move away from
prosecuting minors for prostitution).
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III. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
The Texas Supreme Court decision is significant both because it recognizes
the inconsistency inherent in prosecuting sexually exploited youth and because
it reflects federal trafficking law under the TVPA that considers minors to be
"severely trafficked persons.""' The decision arrived shortly after the passage of
so-called "safe harbor" and "safe children" laws in four states: New York, Con-
necticut, Washington, and Illinois. Michigan also prohibits prosecution of mi-
nors for prostitution if they are under age sixteen. 33 Subsequently, three more
states took action. 34 With legislation similar to the Safe Harbor laws pending or
attempted in other jurisdictions, which would bar or reduce prosecution of
children for prostitution, it is clear that a growing number of states are recog-
nizing current tensions in the law. The language in these laws is derived from
federal trafficking regulations under the TVPA.2 35
New York State led the way toward reform when it passed the Safe Harbor
for Exploited Children Act (Safe Harbor Act)' in 2008. The Safe Harbor Act
took effect in April 2010,237 just two months before the Texas Supreme Court's
In re B. W. decision. Connecticut and Washington followed suit with the pas-
sage of their own versions of the Act and other states have introduced similar
legislation, some without success.238 While New York provided a model for
232. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8).
233. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.448 (2011) ("A person 16 years of age or older who
accosts, solicits, or invites another person in a public place or in or from a build-
ing or vehicle, by word, gesture, or any other means, to commit prostitution or to
do any other lewd or immoral act, is guilty of a crime."). Initially, however, the
age identified in the statute was seventeen or older, and it was lowered to sixteen
in 2oo2. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750-448 (2001); Act of June 1, 2002, Pub.
Act No. 45, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 124, 125.
234. See Act of Nov. 21, 2011, 2011 Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 178 (H.B. 3808) (West) (to be
codified in scattered sections of MAsS. GEN. LAWS); Act of July 20, 2011, 2011
Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 1, art. 4 (ist Spec. Sess., S.F. i) (West) (codified at scat-
tered sections of MINN. STAT.); Act of May 31, 2011, 2011 Vt. Legis. Serv., Act No.
55 (H. 153) (West) (codified at scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN.).
235. For example, New York's law specifically incorporated and referenced 22 U.S.C.
§ 7102(8) (2000). See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4 (McKinney 20o8).
236. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 4 47-I.C (McKinney 2007) (effective Apr. 1, 2olo); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4; A.B. 5 258-C, 2007-2oo8 Leg., 231st Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S.
3175-C, 2007-20o8 Leg., 231st Sess. (N.Y. 2007). While the formal title includes an
alternative spelling of "Harbour," it became known in media discussions as the
Safe Harbor Act and will be referred to as such in this Article. See, e.g., Editorial,
Victory for Exploited Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 20o8, at A2o.
237. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4.
238. See, e.g., H.B. 2687, 5oth Leg., ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (barring minors from
prosecution for prostitution and providing authority to take them into protective
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enumerating the protective services that states should implement, the most
comprehensive act to date to legally disallow prosecution is the Illinois Safe
Children Act of 2010.
A. New York Legislation Takes the First Steps
The Safe Harbor Act was a long time in the making; its turbulent history
reveals many of the deep political divisions and other obstacles that stand in the
way of more effective and humane responses to the domestic trafficking of
children. Though the Safe Harbor Act was passed in 2008,240 it was first intro-
duced in 2005. In fact, the bill was drafted in response to the New York appel-
late court's decision in In re Nicolette R., which held that the plain language of
the state penal code did not preclude prosecution of individuals charged with
prostitution based on age. 2 41 Thus, the proposed bill initially sought to amend
the penal code so that only individuals age eighteen and older could be prose-
cuted for prostitution.2 42 The proposed bill mirrored the TVPA, which consid-
ers all prostituted minors to be victims of severe trafficking. However, the New
York legislature did not fully support this novel approach at the time. Further-
more, there was opposition from some law enforcement constituencies who
believed that prosecution was a necessary tool for them to employ
against prostitution.
custody); H.B. 145, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2o1) (unenacted); H.B. 1256,
2009-2oo Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010) (creating a minimum age for pros-
ecution for prostitution, but suffering defeat by opponents); see also Wingfield,
supra note 126 (noting opposition to the safe harbor bill in Georgia by groups who
argued that efforts to change the age at which prostitution can be charged against
a minor were "misguided" and equivalent to decriminalization of prostitution).
In Minnesota, the first bill introduced in 2011 would have protected any child un-
der the age of eighteen under jurisdictional statutes for delinquency. S.F. 1385,
87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 201) (amending the definition of "delinquent child"
or "petty offender," so that a child alleged to have engaged in acts that fall under
the definition of prostitution is excluded from prosecution).
239. Pub. Act. No. 96-1464, 2010 Ill. Laws 6931 (codified as amended in scattered chap-
ters of ILL. COMP. STAT.).
240. Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act, ch. 569, 20o8 N.Y. Laws 4076 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW and N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT).
241. In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
242. See A.B. Ao6597, 2005-2o6 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); see also S. So44 23,
2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
243. While the initial bill did not receive much media attention in 2005, later reform
efforts received more publicity, and the media prominently presented opposing
viewpoints to prosecution reform. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, New Law Shields
Children from Prostitution Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2oo8, at B2; Haberman,
supra note 30.
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When this first attempt to amend the New York penal code failed, a revised
bill was drafted by reformers to carve out a prosecution exemption for prostitu-
tion in the Family Court Act.* Under this approach, children younger than age
sixteen could not be charged with prostitution, yet older teens would remain
eligible for prosecution in criminal court because the family court only has pro-
secutorial jurisdiction over children under the age of sixteen. Though the New
York State Assembly passed versions of this bill, it failed in the State Senate.
Opposition came from the District Attorneys Association of New York State,2 45
which argued that prosecutors' ability to threaten youth with prosecution was
crucial to ensuring testimony against pimps.2 46 Some legislators opposed the bill
because they felt that the counseling and other services it required would be too
costly. 4 7 Additionally, some law enforcement officials argued that the bill
would make it "harder to crackdown on prostitution. "4' Finally, other detrac-
tors claimed that detention was necessary to prevent prostituted youth from
running back to their pimps. 49
Many of these concerns were brought to the fore during a dispute among
state legislators over whether the law should contain language granting judges
the discretion to divert cases back into the delinquency system once they had
244. See A.B. Ao3778, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2007). This bill would have
amended subdivision 1 of section 301.2 of the Family Court Act to define "juvenile
delinquent" as a person between ages seven and sixteen who commits "an act that
would constitute a crime, other than a violation of section 23o.oo of the penal law,"
if committed by an adult. Id. (emphasis added). Section 230.00 of the New York
Penal Law details prosecution for prostitution.
245. Adcock, supra note 115.
246. See Editorial, supra note 120, at A22.
247. See Editorial, Children in Need of Safe Harbor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2007, at Ai6.
Early versions of the bill stated that "[e]very local social services district shall en-
sure that a crisis intervention service and community-based program designed
specifically to serve sexually exploited youth is available to youth residing in such
district." A.B. Ao6597, 200-2o6 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 447-b (N.Y. 2005). The bill
also required that a determination of need be made annually by the local social
services entity charged with the task in consultation with relevant community
stakeholders. Id.
248. See Confessore, supra note 243.
249. See Oversight Hearing Before the Comm. for Youth Servs. & the Comm. for Juvenile
Justice: New York's Sexually Exploited Youth, 2007 N.Y. City Council 42-43 (June
11, 2007) (testimony of Katherine Mullen, Juvenile Rights Attorney, Legal Aid
Soc'y) (discussing arguments made by opponents to the New York Safe Harbor
Act during a hearing in consideration of New York City Council Resolution 863,
which would have called upon New York State legislators to pass the Safe Harbor
Act, A.B. Ao5258-C, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 20o8) and S. S03175-C,
2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008)); Haberman, supra note 30.
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been converted into child welfare matters.250 While the bill originally proposed
an unequivocal bar to prosecuting youth for prostitution, many of the
opponents sought to preserve a semblance of the punishment model by giving
judges discretion to allow prosecution."' Indeed, legislative disagreement over
one word in the text became the main point of contention regarding the bill's
passage. State legislators disagreed over whether the bill would prescribe that a
court "shall" or "may" convert the case from a delinquency petition to a
child welfare matter. 5 This important dispute had resulted in the bill's
earlier failure.2 53
While the Safe Harbor Act underwent many changes to gain support dur-
ing its four-year evolution, a revised version was finally passed in 2008. It was
still considered "groundbreaking"2 5 4 and a "watershed" moment for youth ad-
vocates' efforts to address the commercial sexual exploitation of children in the
United States..2  The law challenged the legal framework employed by almost
every other state at that time wherein prostituted children were consistently re-
garded as criminals; it instead advocated for a treatment approach that recog-
nized their victimization. Given the resistance to, and the four-year campaign
for, the law's passage, its success in reframing the issue was symbolic and began
an important cultural shift. This reform is also particularly significant given
New York's stringent approach to juvenile crime; it is one of only two states
that prosecutes all youth age sixteen and older as adults.25' Advocates also antic-
ipate the law's ability to increase the delivery of widely needed services.5 7
250. Internal Meetings at the Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, N.Y. (June 20o6-July 2007).
Katherine Mullen, who lobbied for the passage of the bill, provided updates about
legislative efforts and opposition leveled against the bill.
251. Id.
252. See Memorandum from the Sex & Law Comm., supra note 116, at 4-5. The assem-
bly version stated that the judge "shall" convert the case, and the senate version
stated that the judge "may" convert the case. Id.
253. Internal Meetings at the Legal Aid Society, supra note 250 (Katherine Mullen dis-
cussing legislative efforts and opposition leveled against the bill).
254. See Press Release, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, Assembly Passes 'Safe
Harbour' Legislation (June 19, 20o8), http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20o8o619/.
255. See POLARIS PROJECT, OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATIVE POLICY To ADDRESS
THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN (2008), available at
http://www.polarisproject.org/storage/documents/policy-documents/model%2ola
ws/model%20safe%2oharbor%2olaw/o20overview%2ofinal-1.pdf.
256. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2oo8); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7)
(2009) (defining the age of jurisdiction for delinquency as juveniles under age six-
teen); Soler, Schoenberg & Schindler, supra note 109, at 496 (citing CHRISTOPHER
HARTNEY, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, FACT SHEET: YOUTH UN-
DER AGE 18 IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2006), available at
http://www.nccdcrc.org/nccd/pubs/2oo6may-factsheet youthadult.pdf) (noting
that "[i]n 2007, Connecticut raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from 16
to 18 for all but the most serious and violent offenders," leaving only North Caro-
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First, the Act creates a legal presumption that any person under the age of
eighteen who is charged with prostitution is a "severely trafficked person" using
the same definition and age as the TVPA." The Safe Harbor Act includes a
comprehensive definition of sexually exploited youth and provides broad vic-
tim protections. 59 And, like the TVPA, the Act explicitly assumes that children
involved in prostitution have been subject to force, fraud, or coercion. Thus,
these children do not have the legal burden of establishing coercion in cases
where they are arrested for prostitution.26 0
Second, the Safe Harbor Act mandates that trafficked children under age
sixteen be treated as status offenders, rather than designated as delinquents.
Status offenders are defined in New York law as "persons in need of supervi-
sion" (PINS).2 6' Children receiving the PINS designation may obtain support
lina and New York with sixteen as the age of juvenile court jurisdiction); see also
supra notes 1o8-1o and accompanying text.
257. See Press Release, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, supra note 254 ("The passage
by the Assembly of Safe Harbour For Exploited Children Act today is a recogni-
tion that domestically trafficked children deserve to be protected by New York
State, and now will receive the services they so desperately need." (quoting Kathe-
rine Mullen, Juvenile Rights Attorney, Legal Aid Soc'y) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
258. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4 (incorporating the definition used in 22 U.S.C.
§ 7102(8) (20o6)). "Severe forms of trafficking in persons" is defined under the
TVPA as "sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud,
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained
18 years of age." 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8).
259. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4; id. § 735 (describing services for youth, such as safe
houses, "counseling and therapeutic services, educational services including life
skills services and planning services to successfully transition residents back to the
community"); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 447-a (McKinney 2007).
260. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4 ("In any proceeding under this article based upon an
arrest for an act of prostitution, there is a presumption that the respondent meets
the criteria as a victim of a severe form of trafficking as defined in section 7105 of
title 22 of the United States Code (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000).").
See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (referenced in 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(C) in order to fully
define "victim of a severe form of sex trafficking," a category that specifically in-
cludes persons under eighteen subject to trafficking behavior).
261. In New York, a "status offender" is a "person in need of supervision" (PINS), de-
fined as "[a] person less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school in
accordance with the provisions of [the relevant sections] of the education law" or
who is "incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the law-
ful control of a parent or other person legally responsible for such child's care, or
other lawful authority, or who violates the provisions of sections 221.05 or 230.00
of the penal law." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a). However, the Family Court Act
provides jurisdiction only for prosecution of children under the age of sixteen.
Therefore, while the Safe Harbor Act models its definition of a "severely trafficked
person" on the TVPA, changes to the Family Court Act do not prevent prosecu-
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though the Department of Social Services."' It is significant to note, however,
that when the Safe Harbor Act finally passed, the court retained discretion
under the statute to convert the PINS petition to a delinquency case if it deter-
mined that the minor satisfied one of four conditions: (1) The minor is not a
severely trafficked person under the federal definition; (2) the minor has pre-
viously committed a prostitution offense; (3) the minor was previously placed
with a local commissioner of social services as a PINS; or (4) the minor is
unwilling to cooperate with specialized services ordered by the court."'
This section was a late addition to the initial language of the proposed
law.'4 At least one commentator argued that the language allowing conditional
diversion "defeats the whole purpose" of the bill by allowing large categories of
youth to be excluded from protection.6 5 A related provision allows that, if the
petition is converted to a PINS docket, the court can also later revert the case to
a juvenile delinquency petition if the youth is "out of compliance" with court
tion of teens who are above age sixteen because they are charged in criminal
court. But it does provide persuasive reasoning against doing so and allows them
to receive services in Family Court. See People v. Samantha R., No. 2011KNo92555,
2011 WL 6303402 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 16, 2o1) (dismissing, in the interest of jus-
tice, a petition against a sixteen-year-old girl in criminal court who was arrested
for loitering for the purpose of prostitution, and citing the reasoning advanced in
the Safe Harbor Act).
262. In New York, a child receiving services under the PINS statute may not be or-
dered into a secure detention facility. While the Federal Juvenile Justice and De-
linquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5792, prohibits the practice of detain-
ing status offenders, some states employ the "valid court order" exception in the
statute to place status offenders in detention. This means that if a child violates a
court order, courts in some states would order that child to be detained in secure
facilities with youth who have committed crimes. In those jurisdictions, the use of
a status offense provision in a safe harbor law would provide less protection from
detention for children charged with prostitution. See Nancy Gannon Hornberger,
Improving Outcomes for Status Offenders in the JJDPA Reauthorization, Juv. &
FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2010, at 15. As one study revealed, "[G]irls are more
likely to receive harsh dispositions for relatively minor offenses, particularly for
running away from home," which is a status offense. See MacDonald & Ches-
ney-Lind, supra note 79, at 189. Furthermore, use of the valid court order excep-
tion tends to affect girls more harshly. Id. at 173.
263. See Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act, ch. 569, sec. 2, 20o8 N.Y. Laws 4076,
4078 (codified as amended at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3)).
264. See Editorial, Better Protecting the Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007, at A2o.
265. Id. (noting that an "nth-hour change in the wording of the Senate version would
allow individual judges to decide whether a sexually exploited child should be
given shelter or be treated as a criminal. That defeats the whole purpose and needs
to be dropped."); see also infra note 336.
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orders.26 6 Notably, close to the Act's effective date two years later, legislators
amended the criteria that enabled continued prosecution.217 As a result, a child
who had a previous placement with a local commissioner as a PINS is no longer
disqualified from protection under the Safe Harbor Act. In addition, the pre-
sumption that the child is a severely trafficked person may no longer be rebut-
ted. 68
Third, the Safe Harbor Act requires every local social services district to
provide, "to the extent that funds are available," a short-term safe house, twen-
ty-four-hour crisis intervention, and access to medical care for sexually ex-
ploited children who live in the district."9 The law also recognizes that counties
should plan for the separate and distinct needs of girls, boys, and transgendered
youth.2 70 Additionally, the Act explicitly states that support services are an
important component of treatment.3 ' The Act is meant to discourage the use of
prosecution as a means to curb existing behaviors by utilizing appropriate assis-
tance tools instead. However, the Act itself provides no direct funding for sup-
port services.2 72
It is possible that, despite the Act's powerful language, some of its intended
purposes will be diminished by its provisions that allow for the continued pros-
ecution of these youth,27 as well as a lack of funding to provide for services. For
example, despite the fact that the Act's effective date was deliberately set for
over a year after enactment for funding planning purposes, safe housing and
therapeutic services remained scarce when the effective date arrived.174
The first published decision to apply the Safe Harbor Act in New York
both demonstrates the possible weakening effect of the Act's conditional lan-
guage and arguably contradicts the intent of the law. In the initial stages of the
case, the New York Family Court refused to substitute the juvenile delinquency
petition with a PINS petition as it is required to do under the law unless certain
266. The court must state its reasons for pursuing a delinquency petition on the
record. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3).
267. See Act of July 2, 2010, 2olo N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 58, pt. G, sec. 4 (West) (codified
as amended at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311-4).
268. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311-4.
269. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 447-b(1) (McKinney 2007).
270. Id.§ 447 -b( 4 ).
271. Id. § 447-b(1).
272. Id. § 447-b( 4 ).
273. See, e.g., In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010) (refusing the res-
pondent child's request to convert the charge of prostitution from a delinquency
case to a PINS case).
274. See Baker, supra note 121 (referencing the fact that, as of July 2010, funds had not
yet been allocated to support the New York Safe Harbor for Exploited Children
Act because of a budget deficit).
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conditions are present, such as a "current unwillingness to cooperate with spe-
cialized services.""' The court conceded that the accused girl, Bobby P., was a
"victim of a severe form of trafficking" under federal and state law."' Even
though no prior delinquency or PINS adjudications disqualified her from
diversion, the court expressed serious doubts as to her "current willingness to
accept and cooperate with specialized services for sexually exploited youth."2
Instead of converting the case to a PINS matter, the court provided a de-
tailed account of the child's history of running away from foster care. The court
made only a passing reference to the fact that Bobby P. was in foster care
because her parents' rights were terminated at some previous time."' The court
then gave a detailed list of the characteristics that are all too familiar for this
population: Bobby P. allegedly was first prostituted when she was twelve and
was "already introduced to the lifestyle,"'7 9 was "working with adult pimps,"
and gave birth to a child who was removed from her care.2"o The court went on
to note that Bobby P. had a prior arrest, and was "picked up at a pimp's house"
in previous months."' The court described Bobby P.'s previous inability to fol-
low through with aid services in prior years. It also discredited the notion that
she would assist the prosecution because she had left a meeting at the
District Attorney's Office "about assisting in the prosecution of her pimp" and
did not return."'
The irony of this decision is that most of the children who are charged with
prostitution meet the precise description that the court noted in In re Bobby P.:
It was Bobby P.'s desperate circumstances that led her to make the choices she
did-or left her with a perceived or real lack of choices-but the court none-
theless used her circumstances as reasons to prosecute her, rather than reasons
not to prosecute her.
First, involvement with an "adult pimp" is assumed to be coercive under
the Safe Harbor Act and is extremely common for prostituted youth. Second,
Bobby P.'s early age of entry left her without the capacity to legally "consent" to
sex at that time and made it difficult for her to conceive of the notion that she
could remove herself from the situation. And third, her runaway history was
275. In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d. at 545.
276. Id. at 546-47.
277. Id. at 547.
278. See id. at 549.
279. Id. at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
280. In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d at 542; cf Kershaw, supra note 33, at 56 (noting that
young prostituted girls with children "have the added risk of being stigmatized
and labeled ... as 'unfit mothers"' and facing removal of their children).
281. In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
282. Id. at 541-42.
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evidence of her isolation from support; runaway histories are routinely noted as
the number one at-risk characteristic for commercial sexual exploitation.283 Yet
the court used all three of these factors as damning evidence against Bobby P. In
addition, the notion of testifying against one's pimp is complex and would
leave a vulnerable young person like Bobby P. in a dangerous position.2
84 A
fourteen-year-old pregnant minor would likely be daunted, if not terrified, by
this task. This is especially true given the likelihood of post-traumatic stress and
psychological issues common for someone in Bobby P.'s situation who does not
have parents to support her."'5
In re Bobby P. also reveals another "elephant in the room": There are few
specialized services actually available for prostituted youth, even in an urban
area with high numbers of youth in need of such services. For example, Bobby
P. was referred to one of the model programs for such youth when she was in
foster care. But even this program had not received necessary increases in fund-
ing when the Safe Harbor Act became effective.286 In other words, for children
to be successfully engaged in specialized services, those services must be effec-
tive and well supported. Nationally, it is reported that there are fewer than fifty
beds with specialized services available for trafficking victims. 8 7 What are avail-
able are juvenile detention beds. And as long as they are more readily available
than the specialized services contemplated by the statute, it is clear that they will
be utilized instead.
283. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of foster
care and runaway histories among prostituted youth).
284. See Zraick, supra note 63, at A28 (noting that "victims, particularly minors, are
often fearful of speaking out against their pimps" and need services and
counseling to recover and to overcome the fear); Editorial, supra note 120 (noting
that "these are battered, terrorized children who are typically in no condition to
confront their exploiters in court. By threatening to lock them up, we deepen
their distrust of an adult world that has brutalized and mistreated them."); see also
United States v. Doss, 630 F-3d 1181, 1190 (9 th Cir. 2011) (discussing a conviction
for witness tampering in a minor sex trafficking case wherein the defendant
threatened the minor while his case was pending, telling her that it would be bad
for her to testify). In Doss, the defendant threatened the minor through a metal
divider as they were being transported back to jail from court during his
trial. Id. This case evidences the practical implications of treating minors who
have been prostituted as offenders.
285. See In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (noting Bobby P.'s history in the child wel-
fare system and that her parents' rights had been terminated); see also Todres,
supra note 34, at 464, 467 (noting the presence of symptoms consistent with PTSD
among sex trafficking victims).
286. See Baker, supra note 121.
287. KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES & ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERv., SEX TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2011).
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B. Other States Implement Varied Approaches to Safe Harbor Legislation
Subsequent laws passed in Connecticut and Washington in 2010 and in
three other states in 2011 continued the process of reform by amending statutes
to address the prosecution of minors for prostitution. The laws share many of
the positive reforms enacted by the New York Safe Harbor Act but also fail in
substantive ways to comprehensively protect all youth, though some approach-
es, such as Connecticut's, have greater protective potential.
Washington's Sex Crimes Involving Minors Act applies to all children
under age eighteen and provides that a minor's first offense of prostitution shall
be diverted out of juvenile court."' However, if a youth has a prior prostitution
offense, Washington's law does not preclude prosecution since a prosecutor is
not required to divert the youth's case out of the delinquency system.289 There-
fore, a second allegation of prostitution may result in prosecution even though
the same child, if under the age of sixteen, remains a victim of statutory rape
under Washington law.29o
Like New York's law, Washington's law seeks to link sexually exploited
youth to appropriate services by stating: "[W]ithin available funding, when a
youth who has been diverted ... for an alleged offense of prostitution or prosti-
tution loitering is referred to the department, the department shall connect that
child with services and treatment specified.""' Unlike New York's law, the
Washington law created a fund for these services. Monies for this fund are in
part obtained by an increase in the fine for redeeming any vehicle that is im-
pounded in connection with a charge of commercial sexual abuse of a minor. 9
Though the amount of funds available through this provision is not clear and
would be unlikely to fund the extensive services required, it provides a starting
point. The law explicitly states that these funds are to be used for services aimed
at youth who have been diverted under the Sex Crimes Involving Minors Act
after being charged with prostitution. Such services include mental health and
substance abuse counseling, education and vocational programming, and hous-
ing relief. Funds may also be used to support sexually exploited youth who live
in residential centers with specialized staff.'9 Finally, the Act increases punish-
ments for offenders who sexually exploit minors for commercial purposes by
making them eligible for ten years in prison.2 94
288. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 2301.
289. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(7) (2010).
290. Id. § 9A.44.079.
291. Id. § 13-32A.270.
292. Id. § 43.63A.740. The fine increased from $500 to $2500. These fines are deposited
into a "prostitution prevention and intervention" account established to assist
child victims. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. § 9.68A.100 (stating that penalties are provided under § 9A.20.021).
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Connecticut's law, which took effect October 1, 2010,'9' takes a stronger
approach to eliminating the prosecution of youth for prostitution. Rather than
including only the possibility of diversion to child welfare services, Connecticut
lawmakers amended the penal code so that children younger than age sixteen
simply cannot be prosecuted for prostitution, similar to Michigan's penal
code."' This is consistent with the age of consent in Connecticut's statutory
rape law.2 97 Previously, the Connecticut penal code section on prostitution did
not include a minimum age, and, therefore, any person committing the relevant
acts could be prosecuted for prostitution. The new law also protects
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds by codifying the presumption that teenagers
in that age range who are charged with prostitution "[were] coerced into com-
mitting such offense by another person in violation of section 53a-192a."'9'
Therefore, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds may be prosecuted for prostitution
only if prosecutors rebut this presumption.
The Connecticut law is indeed noteworthy for its unequivocal prohibition
of the prosecution of children under age sixteen for the offense of prostitution.
By doing this, it reconciles the paradox in its laws governing prostitution and
statutory rape. The law's novel two-tiered approach mirrors Connecticut's sta-
tutory rape laws. Because the law is new, it is unclear how the "rebuttable pre-
sumption" language will be interpreted by courts and utilized by prosecutors.
However, it could be a helpful model of compromise for legislators in other
states where there is strong resistance to decriminalizing the actions of older
teens. Similar to New York, though, Connecticut's law does not contemplate
funding specialized services for exploited youth.
Finally, in 2011, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont also passed safe
harbor laws.' 99 Although not as comprehensive as they could be, their passage
recognizes that sexually exploited youth are in need of specialized services and
that the use of prosecution against them should be reduced. But the laws also
illustrate the challenges that different political climates present for comprehen-
295. 2010 Conn. Acts 815 (Reg. Sess.).
296. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.448 (West 2011).
297. Connecticut uses a two-tiered approach to the age of consent in its statutory rape
law. See supra Section II.B (discussing approaches to these laws by various states).
Under Connecticut law, a child under the age of sixteen cannot consent to sex,
except under circumstances in which the other person is within three years of the
child's age. Any child under age thirteen cannot consent to sexual intercourse
when the other person is more than two years older than the child. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-70 (2011).
298. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(c).
299. Act of NOV. 21, 2011, 2011 Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 178 (H.B. 3808) (West) (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS); Act of July 20, 2on, 2o Minn.
Sess. Law Serv., ch. 1, art. 4 (1st Spec. Sess., S.F. 1) (West) (codified at scattered
sections of MINN. STAT.); Act of May 31, 2011, 2011 Vt. Legis. Serv., Act No. 55 (H.
153) (West) (codified at scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN.).
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sive and uniform reform efforts across states as each safe harbor law takes a dif-
ferent approach. For example, like in Connecticut, minors under age sixteen in
Minnesota will not be prosecuted for prostitution due to a change in the defini-
tion of juvenile delinquency by the safe harbor law.3oo In contrast, in Massachu-
setts, protection from prosecution will be made conditional upon agreement by
the prosecutor and upon the child's completion of court-ordered services. 30' Il-
lustrating yet another approach, in Vermont, the law protects all minors under
age eighteen from prosecution if they are deemed victims of sex trafficking, but
curiously appears to contemplate that some minors who are prostituted may
not qualify as such victims under the law.30 2
C. The Illinois Safe Children Act Provides a Model
The most comprehensive legislation to address the prosecution of young
victims of commercial sexual exploitation is the Safe Children Act in Illinois,
signed into law in August 2010.303 Illinois is the first state to make all children
under age eighteen wholly immune from prosecution for prostitution. This is
an important distinction from all other state laws to date. Those laws, while cer-
tainly reducing the prosecution of youth, ultimately allow for prosecutions in
certain circumstances. 30 4
Illinois's statutory rape laws apply to children under the age of seventeen in
most circumstances, but there is a provision in Illinois law that raises the age of
consent to eighteen where the offender is in a position of authority over the
child. 30 Similarly, by excluding them from prosecution for prostitution, the
Safe Children Act appears to implicitly recognize that seventeen-year-olds
remain vulnerable to coercion by certain third parties. In doing so, the Act is
consistent with the TVPA and statutory rape laws in Illinois.
300. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.007(6)(b)(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
301. Act of Nov. 21, 2on, 2on Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 178 (H.B. 3808) (West) (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of MAss. GEN. LAWS).
302. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2652(c)(1)(A) (2011) (exempting from prosecution minors
who are victims of sex trafficking). But see id. § 2652(c)(1)(B) (providing that mi-
nors under eighteen, notwithstanding other provisions of the law, will be "im-
mune from prosecution in the criminal division of the superior court" for prosti-
tution, but may be treated as juvenile delinquents or children in need of services
under VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, chs. 52, 53) (emphasis added)).
303. Safe Children Act, Pub. Act No. 96-1464, 2010 Ill. Laws 6931 (codified as amended
in scattered chapters of ILL. COMP. STAT.).
304. See supra Sections III.A-B (discussing the approaches in New York, Washington,
Connecticut, and Michigan). For example, unlike Connecticut, Illinois does not
use a two-tiered approach to age.
305. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16(f) (West 2011).
56
30 :1 2011
CONSENT, COERCION, AND COMPASSION
Under the Safe Children Act, a person suspected of a prostitution violation
may be detained for a "reasonable" period of time for investigation.306 Howev-
er, once law enforcement officers determine that a detained youth is under age
eighteen, the youth cannot be detained further; she is subject only to temporary
protective custody in the child welfare system.30 7 During this time, a police
officer must report an allegation of trafficking-which is viewed under the Act
as abuse or neglect-to the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services, which then initiates an investigation. In addition, the Act includes
provisions that attempt to connect youth suspected of prostitution with appro-
priate services. The funding provision for these services is similar to the provi-
sion established in the Washington Sex Crimes Involving Minors Act. The Illi-
nois statute increased impoundment fees and partially applies the proceeds
toward grants for nongovernmental organizations that provide services to
victims of commercial sexual exploitation.3os
While the Illinois Safe Children Act is comprehensive in its practical appli-
cation, it also makes a deliberate and symbolic change in the statutory language.
Specifically, it removes the term "juvenile prostitute" from the criminal code.30
Such changes to the statutory text reinforce the identification and treatment of
sexually exploited youth as victims and survivors, rather than as offenders."o
It is important to note the significant distinction between a law like the Safe
Children Act in Illinois and the Safe Harbor Act in New York. Early implemen-
tation in New York reveals a substantial risk that youth may continue to be
treated as offenders, depending on the trial and appellate treatment of cases
involving the Safe Harbor Act subsequent to In re Bobby p.31' Without a
306. Safe Children Act, Pub. Act No. 96-1464, § 11-14(d), 20o Ill. Laws 6931. A "reason-
able amount of time" that police may hold a person before charging her with a
crime is determined by statute and case law. Forty-eight hours is generally the
amount of time permitted as "reasonable" for detention. Cnty. of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
307. Temporary protective custody, if necessary, may not include a detention facility
or a jail. It may include a hospital, other medical facility, foster home, or other
licensed facility. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 (West 2011).
308. The impoundment fee was raised from $2oo to siooo. Half of that fee will go to-
ward the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/36.5-5 (West 2011) (replacing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15 (West 2010)).
309. For example, the Illinois criminal code previously included a title on " [s]oliciting
for a juvenile prostitute," 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1 (West 2003), yet this
was replaced to read "[s]oliciting for a minor engaged in prostitution." Safe
Children Act, Pub. Act No. 96-1464, § 11-15.1, 2010 111. Laws 6931, 6945. However,
this section of the criminal code was repealed in full roughly one year later. See
Act effective July 1, 2011, Pub. Act No. 97-1551, art. 2, sec. 6, 2010 Ill. Laws 81oo.
310. Cf SMITH, VARDAMAN & SNow, supra note 71.
311. See supra notes 275-285 and accompanying text (discussing In re Bobby P., 907
N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010)).
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wholehearted prohibition of the prosecution of youth, a culture persists that is
waiting for the child to demonstrate that she is "is unwilling to participate in
services ordered by the court."312 This kind of sentiment may lead judges with
discretionary authority to divert a case back into the delinquency system. While
states that have taken action with safe harbor laws are all leaders in the move-
ment to better protect sexually exploited youth, Illinois's removal of all minors
under age eighteen from prosecution for prostitution provides a critical ad-
vance in the law and distinguishes it from all other states. The challenge for Illi-
nois will be the implementation of a response system with the appropriate ex-
pertise to serve the children who are identified as vulnerable under the Safe
Children Act, particularly since these children will no longer enter the juvenile
justice system.
IV. REFORMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR SURVIVORS
"It is my hope that in ten years, we will look back and consider it ludicrous
that we ever prosecuted children for prostitution."I"
Implementation of a commonsense, rational approach to help youth who
are exposed to exploitation relies on appropriate action by legislators and on
the proper statutory interpretation of new laws. When statutory language in
safe harbor laws allows diversion from prosecution at the discretion of the
court, judges should adhere to the intention of such laws to protect children,
particularly the most vulnerable of them, from prosecution. Where legislators
do not act and the applicability of prostitution laws for minors are challenged
in courts, judges must reconcile conflicting statutory rape and penal laws. Final-
ly, judges should consider relevant information about adolescent development
when grappling with issues of consent, coercion, and blameworthiness.
State legislators should use lessons learned from pioneering legislative
models in the states that have reformed their laws. Instead of continuing to
allow prosecution, as some do, legislation must take a clear stance and be defin-
itive about age limits on prosecution for prostitution. Additionally, it must
fund appropriate and professional interventions and training.
312. In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d at 547; see supra notes 276-282 and accompanying
text; cf Hornberger, supra note 262, at 17 (discussing related issues about impri-
soning status offenders so that the justice system may provide them with services,
and quoting a state judge who simply stated that "[y]ou have to take that option
off the table" to force communities to create meaningful alternative service
delivery options).
313. Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 70, at 16 (statement of
Rachel Lloyd, Exec. Dir. and Founder, Girls Educ. & Mentoring Servs.).
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A. Judicial Decision Making
In all cases relating to the prostitution of exploited youth, judges must
make decisions with a critical eye toward ensuring coherence within the laws
that are relevant to the commercial sexual exploitation of minors. They must
consider common characteristics among exploited youth, relevant advances in
our understanding of adolescent development, and factors that would eliminate
gender bias in the justice system. In states where the legislature has not acted in
this arena, courts should follow the lead of the Texas Supreme Court and
extend its reasoning to youth older than age thirteen. A holding of this nature
would reconcile some existing conflicts between the prosecution of minors, sta-
tutory rape laws, and new state trafficking laws geared toward the protection of
minors. When courts examine circumstances like those presented in In re B. W.,
they should consider legislative intent in the context of related trafficking and
statutory rape laws, as did the Texas Supreme Court.3 14
There is also a strong argument that factual consent provisions in statutory
rape laws do not preclude older teens from protection against prosecution. In
this regard, judges should consider the implications of the implied coercion
recognized by federal law for all minors under eighteen who are trafficked.
Two-tiered statutory rape laws exist to protect older teens from prosecution
when two "consenting" minors are close in age and engage in sexual activity;
the framework allows teens to assert factual consent, rather than assuming
meaningful legal consent. This distinction supports the conclusion that courts
need not draw a line separating the protection of older and younger teens in
states that employ a two-tiered statutory rape scheme. Knowledge about the
adolescent brain," effects of traumatic bonding,3"6 post-traumatic stress,317 and
society's understanding of domestic minor sex trafficking similarly support that
conclusion. At the very least, that knowledge supports a presumption that older
teens are coerced in trafficking situations. An approach that presumes that
exploitation is coercive for all minors under the age of eighteen is also consis-
tent with federal law, which errs on the side of safety, rather than allowing some
children to fall outside of the umbrella of protection. An inclusive approach
314. See supra Subsection II.B.2 (discussing In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Tex. 2010),
and its rationale for overturning the lower courts, which was based upon legisla-
tive intent to protect children).
315. See Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL
2236778.
316. See Julich, supra note 57, at 1o8-o9.
317. See Jones, supra note 34, at 327; see also Todres, supra note 34, at 447, 464, 467
(noting the prevalence of symptoms consistent with PTSD among victims of sex
trafficking).
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would notably shift the focus of the justice system and law enforcement to the
needs of the child.
Additionally, the judicial role is critical where legislation limits but still
permits prosecution of youth based on judicial determinations about factors in
each case, like characteristics of individual youth or the extent of coercion. In
this situation, interpretations should consider the purpose of the laws to
prevent prosecution, in place of a punitive approach. Some models, such as the
statutes in Connecticut and New York,"' place the court and prosecutors in a
gatekeeper role, though in different ways. This occurs where: (1) conditional
diversion grants judicial discretion about whether a child is amenable to treat-
ment and services,31 9 and (2) where the statute contemplates a "presumption of
coercion" that permits prosecutors to challenge the implied existence of
coercion.32 o In both instances, courts should carefully consider the data that
exists about the effects of the exploitation and surrounding circumstances of
the child's life. For example, data shows that the clear majority of young people
arrested for prostitution have been living on the streets or in unstable housing
situations.321 They have been given little reason to trust authority and the foster
care systems that have often previously failed them?.32 While these circums-
tances may harden such youth, they are not beyond intervention. Therefore,
judges must not consider the manifestations of these past harms as de facto
evidence against struggling youth and their willingness to participate in services
offered.
If reformed laws aim to immunize the majority of children who have
"committed sexual offenses" from criminal prosecution or juvenile delinquency
prosecution,2 3 they cannot be applied only to children who have never run
away, missed appointments with care providers, or cowered at the notion of
testifying against a pimp.32 4 If most children with these histories are deemed by
courts as "unlikely to accept services" and are thus forced to endure prosecu-
tion as a result, then the ultimate intent of reforms in this arena will be ignored.
Diversion applied in this way could become the culprit that critics feared it
318. See supra Part III.
319. See, e.g., supra Section III.A (discussing New York's Safe Harbor Act provisions).
320. See, e.g., supra notes 295-298 and accompanying text (discussing 2010 Conn. Acts
815 (Reg. Sess.)).
321. See supra Section I.A.
322. See supra Section I.A.
323. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 732 (McKinney 2008).
324. See, e.g., Zraick, supra note 63, at A28 (noting that victims are often fearful of
speaking out against their pimps); supra notes 278-282 and accompanying text
(discussing In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010), and noting that
involvement with an adult pimp, difficulty with teen motherhood, and failure to
cooperate with the prosecutor's office was used against Bobby P. in the court's
evaluation of amenability to services).
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would be."' It may take more than one intervention attempt to reach these
young people. If signs of rebelliousness preclude assistance, the reforms will fail
many of the children that they are intended to help. The judiciary must not in-
terpret these common characteristics in a way that perpetuates the prosecution
of these minors.
Furthermore, judges must be vigilant about gender stereotypes when mak-
ing evaluations about whether a child has been coerced and whether that child
is amenable to treatment. Studies show that bias in the justice system results in
higher rates of punishment and harsher penalties for girls than similarly
situated boys."' Therefore, courts must ensure that they do not penalize girls or
gay youth for lack of conformity with stereotypical gender roles.2 7 In these cas-
es, judges often encounter girls who have previously run away from foster care
or rebelled against social services organizations.3?8 In many instances, such be-
havior demonstrates that the current system is ill equipped to help exploited
youth. These failures and the impact of exploitation on children should be con-
sidered before the justice system assumes that a child is simply beyond help. Fi-
nally, courts must consider cases in the context of adolescent development and
emerging explanations of adolescent behavior.32 9 Juvenile court judges often
lack the necessary specialized training to do this.330 The seminal Supreme Court
cases Roper33' and Graham 3 2 crystallize the need for courts to reexamine issues
of culpability when considering youth actions, and for judges to understand
325. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (noting that conditional diversion
"defeats the whole purpose" of safe harbor acts by precluding too many youth
from protection from prosecution, and that such language should therefore be
eliminated).
326. See supra Section I.C.
327. Cf Meda Chesney-Lind & Francine Sherman, Gender Matters in Juvenile Justice,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 2010, at 6 (discussing the treatment of girls in juvenile courts).
328. See supra Sections L.A-B (discussing the prevalence of youth who have been in
foster care or who have run away and the ways in which they become entrenched
in commercial sexual exploitation).
329. See Mutcherson, supra note 92, at 928-29 (noting that judges and policy makers
must be provided with necessary information to distinguish between conflicting
views about adolescent competence in the context of health care decision making
and criminal punishment).
330. This concern is not new and its relevance persists. Indeed, in McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, when the issue of jury trials for juveniles reached the Supreme Court, a
plurality of the Justices noted that the Court had previously expressed concern re-
garding juvenile court judges who are "untrained and less than fully imbued with
an understanding approach to the complex problems of childhood and adoles-
cence." 403 U.S. 528, 534 (1971).
331. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
332. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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new developments in law and science. Scientific information can inform judi-
cial decision making, whether a court is considering (1) conflicts between the
age of eligibility for prosecution for prostitution and the age of consent for sta-
tutory rape laws, (2) prosecutorial rebuttals to the legal presumption of a
youth's coercion, (3) a youth's amenability to treatment, or (4) various disposi-
tion options for a juvenile sentence. Judges must recognize that scientific data
about the adolescent brain should be integral to their decisions about minors'
culpability. This information could influence judicial perceptions about deci-
sion making by minors and could help determine the impact of outside pres-
sures and threats on minors' actions, as the Supreme Court has critically noted.
Such information is relevant and applicable to the complex issues presented by
the prostitution of youth, as found in In re B. W.33 Consideration of these fac-
tors will foster more nuanced decision making and ensure that judges establish
more coherence in the law.
B. Comprehensive Legislative Remedies
"[C]hildren can never consent to prostitution. It is always exploitation. ""1
i. Exclusion from Prosecution
While the courts provide an important frontier for reform, ideally
legislators should take steps to avoid the conflicts that faced the appellate courts
of New York and Texas by amending youth prosecution laws. In doing so, legis-
lators should definitively preclude the prosecution of exploited minors. This
would reconcile statutory conflicts between the treatment of children
under trafficking laws, statutory rape laws, and state penal codes, as displayed in
In re B.W.335
State legislators should explicitly exclude minors from prosecution, follow-
ing the model of the Illinois Safe Children Act. Accordingly, states should avoid
conditional diversion 36 and carve-outs that automatically bar some children
333. 313 S.W. 3d 818, 821 (Tex. 2010).
334. Exploiting Americans on American Soil Hearing, supra note 49, at 6 (statement of
Chris Swecker, Assistant Dir., Criminal Investigative Div., Fed. Bureau of Investi-
gation) (discussing the federal government's position regarding domestic sex traf-
ficking of minors).
335. 313 S.W. 3d 88.
336. "Conditional diversion" refers to statutory schemes that mirror drug court mod-
els in which youth may be criminalized depending on their "compliance," and in
which only certain youth qualify for diversion based upon factors listed in the sta-
tute. See, e.g., supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text (discussing the condi-
tional diversion structure of the New York Safe Harbor Act).
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from exemption from prosecution."' If children can "never consent to prostitu-
tion," they should not be punished or be allowed to face confinement in deten-
tion facilities for acts of prostitution. Without a clear legislative stance, some
minors-often the most vulnerable-will continue to be penalized. New legis-
lation should harmonize existing laws with regard to capacity to consent and
prosecution.
Conditional diversion, while appealing to hesitant lawmakers who are seek-
ing to appease opposing constituencies, presents three significant problems and
perpetuates "blaming the victim." First, under that regime, commercial sexual
exploitation is still framed as a "criminal" or "delinquency" problem. It fails to
ensure appropriate treatment or foster the cultural shift necessary for reform to
succeed. Next, treating children as offenders can hinder law enforcement even
when children are in custody, especially when they do not receive proper
psychological and medical treatment.338 Failure to address post-traumatic stress
and traumatic bonding implicates not only the well-being of the child but also
her potential cooperation with law enforcement.33 9 And finally, placing too
many conditions on the availability of protection from prosecution to a
troubled young person can render a law meaningless.340 The first published
decision applying New York's Safe Harbor Act illustrates this point and con-
founds the well-reasoned intent of the law.341 States would be well advised to
fully consider the implications of conditional diversion language as opposed to
language that fully removes the child's eligibility for prosecution.3 42
337. Washington's Sex Crimes Involving Minors Act bars children from exemptions
from prosecution if they have previously been arrested for prostitution. WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.40.070(7) (2010); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (McKinney
2008); Toolsi Gowin Meisner, Update: Shifting the Paradigm from Prosecution to
Protection of Child Victims of Prostitution (pt. 1), 21 NAT'L CENTER PROSECUTION
CHILD ABUSE (Nat'l Dist. Atty's Ass'n, Alexandria, Va.), 2009, at 2 (noting that
laws that do not include protection for juveniles who have prior arrests for prosti-
tution fail to consider that the reasons for their continued prostitution may be
due to fear or control of a pimp).
338. See supra Section II.C; supra note 284 (explaining that United States v. Doss, 630
F.3d n81 (9th Cir. 2011), illustrates one problem associated with arresting
a minor).
339. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., In re Bobby P., 907 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding that,
despite Bobby P.'s qualifying as a severe victim of trafficking, her prosecution
would proceed based upon a provision in the Safe Harbor Act that allowed denial
of protection from prosecution).
341. Id.; see supra notes 275-285 and accompanying text.
342. For example, the penal codes in Michigan and Connecticut now provide that only
people age sixteen and older in Michigan and Connecticut can ever be prosecuted
for prostitution. See supra Part III for complete discussions of these laws. The
same is not true in New York. Furthermore, there is debate about whether classi-
fication as a status offender under a PINS statute within New York's Safe Harbor
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Unfortunately, statutory language that fully excludes youth from prosecu-
tion can face steep opposition. In Georgia, efforts to pass safe harbor legislation
failed in 2010, despite widespread critical awareness of the sexual exploitation of
youth in Atlanta and elsewhere in the state.343 In New York, advocates labored
for four years before state legislators passed an amended version of their Safe
Harbor Act.344 But subsequent to those battles, Illinois succeeded in passing
legislation similar to New York's initial proposal, building on efforts in other
states. 45
Arguments in favor of the status quo, or even diversion, fail to fully address
the incoherence of many states' laws, the lack of services for girls in the juvenile
justice system, and the potential benefits to law enforcement346 under a nonpu-
nitive regime. Therefore, advocates of reform must be prepared to respond to
the claims of detractors who are opposed to safe harbor laws preventing prose-
cution. Advocates can highlight the irrationality of the current laws' harmful
effects on children, as well as the potential to shift the approach of law
enforcement. Reforms for youth who are subject to prostitution do not change
the state's ability to prosecute the perpetrators who continue to exploit youth
Act is the optimal mechanism for reform since it stigmatizes children as status of-
fenders. Kate Brittle, Note, Child Abuse by Another Name: Why the Child Welfare
System Is the Best Mechanism in Place To Address the Problem of Juvenile Prostitu-
tion, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1339, 1351 (2008); Susan Pollett, Child Prostitutes: Crimi-
nals or Victims?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 2010, at 4. Many states still permit secure deten-
tion of status offenders under some circumstances. See Hornberger, supra note
262, at 18. While provisions within the Federal Juvenile Justice Delinquency
Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5792 (2006), which funds state delinquency
programs, prohibit this practice in most instances, the Act allows for secure de-
tention if a person in need of supervision fails to comply with a court order. Id.
Some states utilize that exception. Id.
343. Kyle Wingfield, Change the Law To Protect Sexually Exploited Children, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://blogs.ajc.com/kyle-wingfield/2010/
02/05/change-the-law-to-protect-sexually-exploited-children/.
344. See supra notes 246-249 (discussing opposition based on cost as well as opposition
based upon law enforcement officials' belief that prosecution is necessary to curb
negative youth behaviors, to provide services in detention, and to obtain
testimony).
345. See POLARIS PROJECT, H.B. 6462: ILLINOIS' SAFE CHILDREN ACT-SUMMARY
(2010), available at http://www.enddemandillinois.org/sites/default/files/IL
%2oSafe%2OChildren%2oAct%2oSummaryo/2oNov%20201o%2oFINAL.pdf (recog-
nizing that the Illinois Safe Children Act "builds on the progress first made by the
ground-breaking New York Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act of 2008");
POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 255, at 1 (noting that the passage of the New York
law and a pilot program in a county in California "helped spark the serious con-
sideration of similar laws in other[] states").
346. See supra Section II.C (discussing the benefits of federal law enforcement's belief
in victim-centered approaches for victims of sexual exploitation).
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under existing laws at the state and federal level. Such reforms do support the
cultural shift required to build commitment to treatment.
2. Funding for Appropriate Therapeutic Services and Interdiscipli-
nary Partnerships
In addition, legislation must also mandate the creation of and funding for
appropriate professional therapeutic services. Failure to expand and/or create
the necessary medical and psychological services as contemplated by new laws
undercuts their successful implementation. Judges have reported that they feel
forced to send some girls to detention because they have no other treatment
options, even though they know that the girls present no danger to the public
and would be better off in the community.3 47 Additionally, the dearth of servic-
es and resources available to keep victims safe, such as secure housing, can be a
barrier to the successful prosecution of those who exploit youth because it is
more difficult to remove children from the control of pimps and to gain their
trust without such services and resources.348 In other words, the provision of
safe and therapeutic environments for the care of children is advantageous for
their recovery, the first priority, and also for law enforcement, because it would
seem that when children are safely removed from their abusers, they will be
better able to participate with law enforcement when they serve as witnesses.
Under the safe harbor statutes in New York, Michigan, and Connecticut,
there is no legislative funding provision for therapeutic services. New York pro-
vides model language for other states that is specific and comprehensive about
an ideal service delivery system, but statutory language requires specialized ser-
vices only to the extent that funding is available,349 given legislators' apprehen-
sion regarding the cost of new laws. The U.S. Attorney General's Office
acknowledges the need to create more community-based access to care at the
local level, such as safe housing. 3 o But because federal investigators sometimes
347. SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 37.
348. Cf Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 132 (statement of
Francey Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, &
Interdiction, Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.) ("The Department of Justice
recognizes that secure housing and specialized services are critical to meet the
needs of this unique population of child victims."). Additionally, the testimony
discusses the need to provide secure housing in conjunction with building trust
for participation in investigations. Id.
349. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 447 -b(i) (McKinney 2007); Editorial, supra note 247.
350. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 133 (statement of Francey
Hakes, Nat'l Coordinator for Child Exploitation, Prevention, & Interdiction,
Office of the U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen.) (noting that in Fiscal Year 2oo9, "the De-
partment of Justice awarded funding under a new program titled, 'Improving
Community Response to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children' to
four cities in order to develop better community-based approaches to responding
to domestic commercial sexual exploitation).
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coordinate trafficking and prostitution investigations with state authorities,
their success in assisting youth is limited when the states have nowhere for
domestic minors to go, and are unable to provide necessary services, once the
youth are discovered by law enforcement."' States can reform their laws as an
opportunity to access federal funding for state services that support the goal of
helping communities "intervene appropriately with and compassionately serve
victims including [by] providing essential services.""' The few states that are
taking action have made substantial progress; however, lawmakers and advo-
cates everywhere should incorporate into their own approaches lessons learned
from the early implementation phases of safe harbor laws.
Community models for providing services to sexually exploited youth,
though scarce, do exist and have provided far greater assistance to sexually traf-
ficked youth than the current model of detention.353 In order to meet the needs
of minors, successful models should include interdisciplinary efforts to treat the
351. Even though the federal government recognizes that children are victims, not
criminals, services are still lacking: While the Federal Innocence Lost Initiative has
"rescued" noo children in its enforcement efforts, many had no access to relevant
assistance in their local communities. See Joe Markman, Rescued, but Still in Peril:
Child Prostitution Victims Freed in an October Crackdown Aren't Getting the Help
They Need, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at 26 (noting that many girls in
one Innocence Lost initiative were sent back to abusive homes, with some return-
ing to the streets or even being detained by a juvenile justice center); see also
Heiges, supra note 72 (discussing failures in state practices of prosecuting and pu-
nishing juveniles).
352. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 133.
353. See Hornberger, supra note 262, at i8 (citing a University of British Columbia
study of nurse interventions in Minnesota clinics). Nurse intervention programs
for sexually exploited runaway girls reported significant improvements in girls'
lives along with "significant reductions in emotional distress, substance use,
suicide attempts, and risky sexual behavior." Id. Girls Educational and Mentoring
Services is one of the few residential care facilities with specialized services for
commercially and sexually exploited girls and young women. The facility is survi-
vor-led and provides a range of services, including a Transitional Independent
Living Program and a Supportive Housing Program. See Transitional & Supportive
Housing, GIRLS EDUC. & MENTORING SERVS., http://www.gems-girls.org/what
-we-do/our-services/transitional-supportive-housing/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
Other programs are led by law enforcement and, though still operating under
laws that permit prosecution, are developing infrastructures for services that at-
tend to medical needs and safe housing. Rami S. Badawy, Update: Shifting the Pa-
radigm from Prosecution to Protection of Child Victims of Prostitution (pt. 2), 22
NAT'L CENTER PROSECUTION CHILD ABUSE (Nat'l Dist. Atty's Ass'n, Alexandria,
Va.), 201o, at 1-6 (discussing Georgia's child welfare and juvenile justice partner-
ship and similar collaborations in Texas). The article also discusses a progressive
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mental and physical needs of these minors.354 As these models are adopted more
widely, professionals in disciplines with an emphasis on medical care should be
integral to the intervention process because of their relevant expertise.3 5 Doc-
tors and health care providers who have come into contact with these girls have
recently become aware of their plight and may be another helpful point of
access to provide care and build partnerships."' Girls who do not fear arrest
may be more likely to confide in authority figures, such as providers in the
medical community. In addition, prostituted youth must be provided with
access to safe housing. This housing must be off-limits to third party exploiters,
particularly since young girls report that pimps recruit them at known shelters
or group homes.5 7
The argument that specialized services are "too expensive" is difficult to
accept when one evaluates the costs of existing models3'8 For example, the na-
tional average annual cost of a detention bed in the juvenile justice system is
estimated at $88,ooo, though this number can vary significantly.359 Indeed, the
highest estimate in the nation reaches $265,000 a year per child.o Detention
has not proven to be as worthy an investment for states, considering the docu-
354. See Clawson et al., supra note 28, at 13-14, 21 (describing the varied needs of ex-
ploited minors as including mental health counseling, medical care, safe housing,
legal assistance, life skills training, education, and substance abuse counseling).
"Because trafficking victims' needs are complex and extensive, it is impossible for
a single agency to respond effectively to this population," but rather requires col-
laboration. Id. at 21.
355. See 42 U.S.C. § 14o44b (2006) (discussing the professional services to be funded
for juveniles); see also N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 447-b(1) (McKinney 2007) (listing
services needed to effectively aid exploited children such as residential safe houses,
medical care, counseling, crisis intervention and therapy, educational services, life
skills, and transitional planning provided by properly trained staff).
356. See, e.g., Patricia Leigh Brown, In Oakland, Redefining Sex Trade Workers as Abuse
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2o1, at A13.
357. See also CURTIS ET AL., supra note 30.
358. See Adcock, supra note u (noting a comment by a service provider about the
excessive cost of incarceration as compared to community residential treatment).
359. NAT'L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, THE REAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CHANGE:
FINDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM DURING DIFFICULT FISCAL TIMES 13
(2010), available at http://www.kidscounsel.org/NJJN%2Real/o2OCosts%200f
%20Change%2oJun%202010.pdf (citing AM. CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, 20o8 DIREC-
TORY OF ADULT AND JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL DEPARTMENTS, INSTITUTIONS,
AGENCIES, AND PROBATION AND PAROLE AUTHORITIES 19 (20o8)).
360. Id. For example, in New York, the cost of detention is $210,000 per child per year
and recidivism rates are abysmal. See GOVERNOR'S TASKFORCE, CHARTING A NEW
COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK
STATE 10 (2009), available at http://www.nicic.gov/Library/024149 (follow
"Download/View (PDF)" hyperlink and then "Continue" hyperlink).
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mented abuse, lack of basic programs, and high recidivism rates involved with
the detention model.361 In contrast, there is reason to believe that specialized
services would be a better investment.
Given the state of current detention models for prostituted youth, there are
at least three areas where funds should be shifted to support better services and
promote deterrence. First, diverting funds from detention beds to
appropriate services provides a viable source of funding for community-based
therapeutic programming.362 While estimates are sparse, specialized programs
are potentially more cost effective and certainly a more compassionate invest-
ment in the recovery of the children at issue. For example, a new safe house in
Washington, D.C., estimated its annual cost to be sioo,ooo per child.363 Given
the provision of specialized services included in this estimate, this is a compara-
tive bargain. A child who could have received safe house care and specialized
services but is instead sent to detention will likely prove to be more costly to
society in the long term. The right therapeutic treatment reduces the likelihood
that the abused youth will return to the same problems that plagued her past.
Second, the cost of prosecuting youth in terms of resources and time could
be diverted toward apprehending pimps and the abusers who create the
demand for young girls. Current costs include the investigation time of police
and prosecutors, police officers' time to appear and provide testimony in court,
and court oversight and administration of the case. In the juvenile justice
system, the resolution of a delinquency case resulting from prosecution for
361. See generally GOVERNOR'S TASKFORCE, supra note 360, at io (noting the needed
changes in response to a two-year investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, Office of Special Litigation); NAT'L JUVENILE JUSTICE
NETWORK, supra note 359, at 1; Douglas Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency
Treatment To Enhance Rehabilitation, Personal Accountability, and Public Safety,
84 OR. L. REV. 1001 (2005) (discussing numerous investigations by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice Civil Rights Division that find abuse and inadequate medical
and psychological care at various juvenile detention facilities across the country);
Soler, Shoenberg & Schindler, supra note no, at 501 (noting the dangerous condi-
tions of juvenile facilities in the United States). The Governor's Taskforce stated
that because of the violence in youth facilities, "not only do youth leave facilities
without having received the support they need to become law abiding citizens,
but many are also more angry, fearful, or violent than they were when they en-
tered." GOVERNOR's TASKFORCE, supra note 360, at 1o; see also NAT'L JUVENILE
JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 359, at 2 (noting that "current expenditures on in-
carceration of youth have yielded 'dismal' results [and] strikingly high recidivism
rates").
362. NAT'L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, Supra note 359, at 3 (noting that smart
downsizing can realize savings to states and provide youth with more effective
community-based care).
363. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 6, at 149 (statement of Tina
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prostitution requires defense attorneys and prosecutors to appear in court sev-
eral times and can include police testimony, all using scarce time and resources
that could be spent addressing the root of the sex-trafficking tragedy.
Third, there are federal funds that states can access for state victims' servic-
es. The Federal Runaway and Homeless Youth Act was reauthorized with
increased appropriations in 20o8.364 The Act's purpose is to provide support for
states to build an effective system of care for runaway and homeless youth out-
side the child welfare and law enforcement systems.36 5 It acknowledges the need
to create long-term strategies, coordinate federal programs, and treat exploited
youth as victims instead of criminals. 66 These funds should continue to target
prevention and fund specialized residential shelter beds for this population, in
addition to supporting efforts to gather empirical evidence for best practices.
Further, the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act provides financial
incentives for states to keep children out of the delinquency system and juvenile
detention placements.36 7 Therefore, legislation furthering these goals is poten-
tially more cost effective because it responds to federal funding incentives.
Next, the TVPA earmarked money for local communities to expand
resources aimed at assisting domestic minors. In addition, the Domestic Minor
Sex Trafficking Victim and Deterrence Act 68 gained significant support in
Congress. Though it ultimately failed to pass in 2010, it was reintroduced in
2011.369 The Act would amend the TVPA to provide funds to support local ser-
vice infrastructures, assure training for law enforcement, and make
much-needed improvements to the National Crime Information Center sys-
tem, which tracks information about missing, exploited, and runaway child-
ren.370 These data-collection enhancements will help coordinate state child wel-
364. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5701 (West 2o1); see Soler, Shoenberg & Schindler, supra note 109, at
504 (stating that "[t]he Runaway and Homeless Act, recently reauthorized in 2008
with higher levels of appropriations, will help provide new resources to serve
runaway youth outside of incarceration settings and improve the programs avail-
able to youth"). Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 5751 (West 2011) with Runaway and
Homeless Youth Act, Pub. L. No. 108-96, § 5751, 117 Stat. 1167 (2003) (effective
Oct. 10, 2003 to Oct. 7, 2008).
365. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5701(4) (West 2011).
366. Id. § 5701(6).
367. 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (20o6).
368. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Act, S. 2925, H.R. 5575, nith Cong. (2010).
369. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Act, S. 5 96,112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
370. Id. The Act authorized the use of grant funds for shelter for minor victims of sex
trafficking, case management services, mental health counseling, legal services,
and outreach and education programs to provide information about deterrence
and prevention of sex trafficking of minors. It also authorized block grants of ip
to $2,500,000 to different entities for the creation of services under this compre-
hensive victim-centered approach. Id.
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fare agency information with the national system.3 7' The Act also specifically
calls for states to refrain from treating these minors as defendants or delin-
quents. Support for the Act is significant and is another indicator of a cultural
shift recognizing the severity of hardship that is experienced by many exploited
youth . 7 It is that cultural change, along with structural coordination and fund-
ing, that is needed on a large scale to ensure progress.
CONCLUSION
The commercial sexual exploitation of youth is a complex problem that
affects many parts of our society. The growing sophistication with which these
crimes are perpetrated, the deep wounds of the victims, and the failure of
current systems to coordinate, recognize, and address this problem calls for
change. The Texas Supreme Court's In re B.W. decision is symbolic for its
recognition that current laws are flawed both in application and as written. The
Illinois Safe Children Act also serves as a model for legislatures and advocates in
guiding reform efforts. The Act builds on previous laws and recognizes that the
legal system is not rational when it prosecutes victims for their own exploita-
tion. While it is true that many victimized children may be resistant to initial
efforts to assist them, this situation will not improve until our laws at the state
and federal level become coherent and humane. When new laws are passed,
they must stand firm and bar the prosecution of youth for prostitution and
must not include restrictions about which children are immune from prosecu-
tion. They must also include funded mechanisms to create and provide contin-
ued support for appropriate professional interventions. While there are road-
blocks to reform, legislative efforts modeled on the Illinois Safe Children Act
will offer the most coherent solution.
371. See id.
372. See Press Release, Polaris Project, Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Bill Passes
Senate (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.polarisproject.org/media-center/press-releases/
310-domestic-minor-sex-trafficking-bill-passes-senate-dec-13-2010 (quoting Mary
Ellison, Director of Policy of the Polaris Project, who commented that passage by
the Senate was "a sign that America is starting to realize that children in prostitu-
tion are victims of a horrific crime called human trafficking and are in need of
service and support").
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